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I. INTRODUCTION
Within the flow of Supreme Court decisions, opinions occasion-
ally surface that capture the essence of the justices' shared juris-
prudence during a particular period. For example, Lochner v. New
York1 readily comes to mind as the paradigm, and symbol, of the
Court's protection of the free enterprise ideal during the early de-
cades of this century.2 Justice Peckham's majority opinion in
Lochner, and Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion, classically state
the cases for and against the interventionist posture of the Court
during the "Lochner era." These opinions typify the competing ju-
dicial techniques that were available to the Court as it reviewed
the legitimacy of the approaching welfare state. One reads these
opinions and intuits the importance of Lochner.
* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.B.A., 1972,
University of Notre Dame; J.D., 1975, the George Washington University. The author grate-
fully acknowledges Howard I. Kalodner, Dean, Western New England College School of
Law, for providing institutional support toward completion of this Article.
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. See G. GuNTHERa, CONsTrrumiON LAW 441-42 (11th ed. 1985); R McCLOSKEY, THE
AmmucA SuPRE COURT 150-57 (1960); L. TR=BE AMIIucAN CONsTumoNs LAW §§ 8-2 to
8-7 (1978).
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The Court's recent decision in Pennhurst State School & Hospi-
tal v. Halderman3 (Pennhurst II) can be characterized similarly.
In Pennhurst II, the Court held that the eleventh amendment to
the United States Constitution bars federal courts from issuing in-
junctions against state officials on the basis of state law.4 The sim-
plicity of this holding, and its apparent technicality, are deceiving.
One superficial clue to the significance of Pennhurst II is the
length and intensity of both Justice Powell's majority opinion and
Justice Stevens' rejoinder for the four dissenting justices. These
opinions fundamentally clash concerning the basic principles un-
derlying the eleventh amendment, and leave no doubt that the de-
bate will continue.
The importance of Pennhurst II, however, lies deeper than a
disagreement concerning the scope of eleventh amendment immu-
nity.5 As was true of Lochner, Pennhurst II is a symbol-this time
illustrating the Court's recently altered perception of judicial fed-
eralism. The concept of judicial federalism generally is described
best as including the weave of doctrines spun by the Supreme
Court to allocate cases and controversies between the federal and
state judicial systems.6 The Court developed these doctrines to
3. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
4. Id. at 117, 121. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Sub-
jects of any Foreign State." US. CONST. amend. XI.
5. The diverse foci of the principal commentaries on the decision illustrate the richness of
Pennhurst I. See, e.g., Brown, Beyond Pennhurst II-Protective Jurisdiction, the Elev-
enth Amendment, and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response
to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L. Rav. 343 (1985); Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty and Fed-
eral Court Power: The Eleventh Amendment After Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 HAsnNGS
CONsT. L.Q. 643 (1985); Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government Of-
ficers, 1984 Sup. CT. Rav. 149; Rudenstine, Pennhurst and the Scope of Federal Judicial
Power to Reform Social Institutions, 6 CARnozo L. Rav. 71 (1984); Shapiro, Wrong Turns:
The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARv. L. RE V. 61 (1984); Smith, The
Eleventh Amendment, Erie, and Pendent State Law Claims, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 227
(1985).
6. The concept of judicial federalism stems from the structural assumptions underlying
the Constitution that states would continue to exist under the new national government and
that the states' role as lawmakers and governing bodies would be preserved. See Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); L. TamB, supra note 2, § 3-30; THE FEDERALIST No. 40 (J.
Madison). The tenth amendment to the United States Constitution reflects this understand-
ing. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. Although the eleventh amendment is the only explicit con-
stitutional limitation on the power of federal courts to review state government actions,
[Vol. 27:449450
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control the tension inherent in a dual system of government. As an
issue, it is constant. Considerations of judicial federalism must be
addressed, expressly or implicitly, in any litigation that affects
state and national interests. As a legal conception, however, it is
variable. The allocation of the nation's litigation that judicial fed-
eralism dictates at any particular time reflects the jurisprudential
orientation of the Court.
Because of this variability in application, judicial federalism in
operation is more a stance of the Court than a legal doctrine. As a
general matter, if the Court is inclined to interpret federal rights
broadly and solicitously, it probably will resolve judicial federalism
issues in favor of allowing access to federal courts. Conversely, if
the Court highly values state autonomy, it probably will channel
litigants into state courts. Over the last four decades, following an
extended period of trial and error, the Supreme Court carefully has
built flexibility into the judicial federalism framework. Since the
beginning of the Court's modern era in 1937, the justices have been
"there nonetheless exists a substantial body of law which restricts the authority of the fed-
eral judiciary in order to preserve state autonomy." L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-30, at 114.
These limitations come both from Congress and from the federal judiciary. This Article
focuses on the judge-made components of judicial federalism, although it does not purport
to do so completely.
Commentators tend to highlight the restrictive aspect of judicial federalism. See L. TrmE,
supra note 2, §§ 3-30, 3-39; Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191,
1193-94 (1977). This emphasis is understandable because the Court's typical invocation of
judicial federalism operates to restrict access to federal courts in deference to state auton-
omy. See Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts, 60 N.C.L. Rv. 59 (1981).
This emphasis, however, can be misleading. Properly viewed, judicial federalism operates as
a neutral regulator of the federal system. In one of the modem Court's most expansive
descriptions of judicial federalism, Justice Black made this point clear:
The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than
it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National
Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the
concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legiti-
mate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the Na-
tional Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not
unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). As Justice Black's remarks so aptly demonstrate,
judicial federalism implies in some cases that state autonomy must give way to the need to
secure a federal forum for the exposition and protection of federal rights. See, e.g., Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
7. See Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist
Era, 80 HARv. L. REv. 604, 604 (1967).
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wary of absolutes that mandate or foreclose federal jurisdiction.
Instead, the Court has fashioned methodologies that have allowed
it to weigh with some precision the federal and state interests im-
plicated in each particular case.8
Pennhurst II crystallized a change in that approach. The abso-
luteness of the Court's preclusion of federal injunctions directed to
state officials based on state law is the most striking feature of the
Court's simple and technical resolution of the Pennhurst litigation.
Pennhurst II, like Lochner, however, is no aberration. It builds on
a number of trends that began to develop in the early 1970's. The
decision itself reflects recent doctrinal shifts by the Court, includ-
ing the expansion of eleventh amendment immunity9 and the con-
traction of pendent jurisdiction. 0 More generally, Pennhurst II il-
lustrates recent decisions, under a variety of doctrinal headings, in
which the Court has constricted the availability of federal courts to
litigants challenging state and local government actions, particu-
larly in "institutional lawsuits.""'
8. See Wells, supra note 6, at 60. With a few noteworthy exceptions, the Court's tendency
toward moderation and flexibility is characteristic of its traditional approach to constitu-
tional decisionmaking. See R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 2, at 138, 168.
9. Compare Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (Federal Employers' Liability
Act authorized federal suit for damages against state-owned-and-operated railroad despite a
claim of eleventh amendment immunity) with Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (elev-
enth amendment barred award against state agency for retroactive benefits wrongfully with-
held by state officials) and Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department
of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (Fair Labor Standards Act did not authorize
suit for overtime pay and damages against state agency that had not consented to federal
jurisdiction).
10. Compare United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (federal court that en-
tertained individual's suit against union for violation of Labor Management Relations Act
had pendent jurisdiction to hear individual's suit against union based on state tort law) with
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978) (when federal jurisdiction is
based on diversity of citizenship, plaintiff may not assert claim against third party defend-
ant without an independent basis for federal jurisdiction over that claim) and Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (doctrine of pendent jurisdiction does not extend jurisdiction
over a party for whom no independent basis for federal jurisdiction exists). See generally
Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal Courts: A Revised Rationale for Pendent Jurisdic-
tion, 75 Nw. U.L. Rv. 245, 246-47 (1980) (noting that expansive use of pendent jurisdiction
by federal judges has been limited by recent Supreme Court decisions).
11. See Brown, supra note 5, at 344, 361; Rudenstine, supra note 5, at 72. "Institutional
lawsuits" are actions brought in federal court against state and local governments, asserting
constitutional violations and alleging that more than a prohibitory injunction is required as
a remedy. Typically, institutional decrees place affirmative requirements on state and local
officials, require expenditures of state resources, and provide for judicial supervision over
452
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These features of Pennhurst II converge when considered in
light of the decision's curious effect on "Pullman abstention," a
doctrine that the Court designed more than forty years ago as a
binding thread of judicial federalism. 12 Pullman abstention ad-
dresses a particularly sensitive type of lawsuit in our federal sys-
tem-namely, an action in federal court challenging the constitu-
tionality of actions taken by state or local officials.13 The doctrine
allows federal judges discretion to delay constitutional review in
such public law litigation14 if the judge sees an uncertain question
of state law that could dispose of or transform the case. The judge
exercises this discretion by remitting the state law question to the
state court system. Under Pullman abstention, the federal judge
must decide the constitutional question only if the case returns to
the operation of government instrumentalities. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers,
35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 949, 949 (1978); see Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker:
Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REv. 43, 44-46 (1979);
Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L REv. 715, 715-17 (1978). Federal courts
have been especially inclined to grant these expansive remedies against state governments.
See Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 661, 661-62 (1978). The Court's wariness of assuming jurisdiction over institutional
lawsuits has been apparent for more than a decade. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95 (1983) (standing); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (political question).
12. Pullman abstention derives its name from Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941). Although similar judicial abstentions may have occurred before Pullman, see P.
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & FL WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 988-89 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHS-
LER], Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Pullman first articulated the doctrine fully.
See Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doc-
trine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1974). Pullman abstention is the oldest and most
clearly established of several Supreme Court abstention doctrines. See 17 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 449 (1978).
13. Pullman abstention is not available when state action is challenged only on statutory
grounds. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 490 (1949); see 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 12, at 454-55.
14. Professor Chayes has used the term "public law litigation" to describe lawsuits
brought both to settle grievances concerning the administration of public programs and to
vindicate public policies traced to statutory or constitutional provisions. See Chayes, Fore-
word: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REv. 4, 4 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Chayes, Foreword]; Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976). Professor Chayes has observed some hostility in the Su-
preme Court's approach to public lawsuits since the mid-1970's. See Chayes, Foreword,
supra, at 7, 8-26.
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federal court because final resolution of the state issue has not re-
solved the controversy. 15
The configuration of the Pennhurst litigation was identical to
the litigation in Pullman. Both cases involved lawsuits filed in fed-
eral court, which raised both state claims and federal constitu-
tional claims against state officials, but which could have been re-
solved on the state law claims alone. The Supreme Court, however,
did not consider Pullman abstention as a potential resolution of
the Pennhurst litigation."8 Instead, the Court replaced the meth-
odology of a discretionary stay envisioned in Pullman with a rule
of mandatory dismissal. As a result, the role of Pullman abstention
in allocating decisionmaking responsibility in suits against state of-
ficials was transmuted substantially without a word of explanation
by the Court.
This Article considers the effect of the inflexible eleventh
amendment rule announced in Pennhurst II on the role of Pull-
man abstention in implementing judicial federalism. The Article
begins by developing the interplay of judicial federalism doctrines
in the context of public law litigation presenting the Pullman-
Pennhurst configuration of parties and claims. The Pennhurst liti-
gation then is summarized against that backdrop. Next, the Article
speculates on the altered role of Pullman abstention in the post-
Pennhurst world of public law litigation. Finally, the Article re-
flects on the message of Pennhurst II, and concludes that the
Court must return to a moderate vision of judicial federalism.
II. JUDICIAL FEDERALISM: THE DOCTRINAL WEAVE
Since its inception, the Supreme Court has struggled with the
task of allocating judicial business in a federal system. Although
the framers of the Constitution had no difficulty perceiving the
need for a supreme, national court to exercise the nation's judicial
15. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 304 (4th ed. 1983); see also England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-19 (1964) (plaintiff may elect
to litigate constitutional claim in state court or may elect to reserve the claim for disposition
in federal court after state proceeding has terminated).
16. In his majority opinion, Justice Powell referred to Pullman abstention only in pass-
ing, and not as a potential vehicle for deciding Pennhurst IL See 465 U.S. at 122.
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power, 17 the corresponding need for a system of lower federal
courts was a matter of much debate. The question generated great
controversy at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and it pro-
duced a split between those who supported a system of national
trial courts to protect federal rights and interests and those who
feared that such a rival judicial system would threaten state auton-
omy.18 The compromise between these polar positions was prag-
matic, but brilliant. The delegates simply framed the question and
passed it along to Congress for resolution. Article In of the Consti-
tution established a supreme court and authorized Congress to cre-
ate inferior courts as it deemed appropriate."9
The spirit-or perhaps necessity-of compromise again pre-
vailed when the First Congress took up the question that the fram-
ers had deferred. Both sides won important victories in the Judici-
ary Act of 1789.20 Those who had sought constitutional creation of
a system of federal trial courts won statutory establishment of just
such a system. Those who were jealous of state autonomy and who
wished to preserve the power and influence of state courts, how-
ever, also won a significant victory. The power that Congress pro-
vided the federal courts was quite limited, consisting primarily of
17. See Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Fed-
eral Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 52 (1975).
18. Id. at 53-54. According to Professor Redish and Mr. Woods, the supporters of a sys-
tem of lower federal courts, led by James Madison, argued that appellate review by the
Supreme Court would not provide adequate protection against potential bias by state
judges. Id. at 53. The opponents of federal trial courts, on the other hand, believed such
courts would be an expensive redundancy of state court systems already in place. The oppo-
nents also argued that a federal judiciary would encroach on the states' jurisdiction and
sovereignty. Id. at 53-54. At various times during the Convention, each position carried the
day. Id.
19. Id. at 53-54. Article I reads, in pertinent part- "The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. The Supreme Court
has interpreted article III as providing Congress with plenary power to create lower federal
courts and to authorize their exercise of the judicial power delineated in article I or any
lesser power that Congress deems appropriate. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441,
448-49 (1850); M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
PowER 21-24 (1980). For a challenge to the conventional interpretation, see Eisenberg, Con-
gressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE J. 498 (1974).
20. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. The continuation of the tendency toward
compromise is hardly surprising, because the First Congress, which enacted the Judiciary
Act, included many members who had participated in framing and ratifying the Constitu-
tion. See C. JACOBS, THE ELEvENTH AMENDM. m AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNrrY 41 (1972).
1986]
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admiralty and diversity jurisdiction. 1 Most significantly, Congress
failed to grant the lower federal courts general power to hear cases
arising under federal law.2 2 Because of these features, the Judiciary
Act of 1789 largely appeased the opponents of lower federal courts.
Under the Act, state courts generally would resolve suits involving
questions of constitutional construction or the application of acts
of Congress, subject to Supreme Court review in certain categories
of cases.2 3
A. From .Compromise to a Nationalist Extreme: Chisholm v.
Georgia
Against this background of compromise and finesse, the Su-
preme Court decided Chisholm v. Georgia.4 Alexander Chisholm
was the executor of a deceased South Carolina merchant's estate.
Georgia had purchased war supplies from the merchant in 1777.
Chisholm filed suit in the Supreme Court of the United States
seeking payment for the supplies, and Georgia responded with a
claim of sovereign immunity.2 5 Only Justice Iredell agreed with
21. See Schenkier, supra note 10, at 252. Judge Hufstedler has observed wryly that Con-
gress, when creating lower federal courts in 1789, "lavished little acclaim and less jurisdic-
tion on its offspring." Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the
Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 841, 843 (1972).
22. The judicial power that Congress could have reposited in the lower federal courts
extends to, among other things, "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this constitu-
tion, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see supra note 19. Of course, after passage of the
Judiciary Act, Congress remained free to authorize lower federal courts to hear specific
types of federal questions. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738 (1824). Professor Weinberg has suggested that Congress' reluctance to grant general
federal question jurisdiction may have stemmed from a fear of federal injunctions against
state judicial proceedings and state executive actions. See Weinberg, supra note 6, at 1197.
The provisions of the Judiciary Art of 1789 delineating the jurisdiction of lower federal
courts are summarized in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 33-35.
23. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85. The Act essentially provided for
Supreme Court review of decisions by the highest state court if the state court had sus-
tained state action against federal objections or if the state court had invalidated federal
action. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 55.
24. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
25. See C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 46-48. Chisholm first had sought payment from the
Georgia legislature. The legislators had refused to pay and had advised Chisholm to sue the
commissioners whom the State had charged to pay the amount due. The commissioners,
however, were insolvent. Chisholm therefore had brought suit against the State in a Georgia
federal court, seeking the amount due under the contract, interest, and consequential
456
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Georgia's assertion. The other four justices concluded that article
III, which extends federal judicial power to cases "between a State
and Citizens of another State,"2 6 allowed jurisdiction over the
case.2 7 As one commentator has noted, Chisholm "was the first
case directly pitting the Court against a state government, and
raised the perennial issue of state sovereignty under the Constitu-
tion. '28 This point was not lost on the justices. Justice Wilson, who
wrote the principal opinion for the prevailing justices, left no
doubt concerning the structural outcome when he argued that, "as
to the purposes of the Union, Georgia is not a sovereign state."29
damages. That court, which included Supreme Court Justice James Iredell, had dismissed
the suit for lack of jurisdiction because of Georgia's sovereign immunity from suit. The in-
domitable Chisholm then filed an original action in the Supreme Court. See id. at 47. For
useful historical background on the Chisholm litigation, see Mathis, Chisholm v. Georgia:
Background and Settlement, 54 J. An HIsT. 19 (1967); C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 41-55.
26. U.S. CONST. art. M, § 2, cl. 1. Traditionally, commentators have concluded that the
framers did not intend the state-citizen diversity clause of article III to abrogate state im-
munity from suit. See, e.g., L. TRIE, supra note 2, at 130-31; 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91 (1922); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton)
(explaining why states' sovereign immunity from suit would not be affected by ratification
of the Constitution by noting "[T]here is no color to pretend that the State governments
would, by adoption of [the Constitution], be divested of the privilege of paying their own
debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations
of good faith."). Some recent scholarship contests that conclusion. See, e.g., C. JACOBS, supra
note 20, at 40; Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:
Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 527 (1977); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1889, 1913-14 (1983). The most
prudent, and probably most correct, conclusion is that the original understanding of the
state-citizen diversity clause is unclear. See M. REDISH, supra note 19, at 139-40.
27. Article III vests original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over cases "in which a
State shall be Party." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. That constitutional grant was imple-
mented in section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat.
73, 80.
28. C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 46-47. Indeed, Chisholm may be viewed as the Court's
first constitutional decision. See Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than
a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. Rav. 1033, 1054 (1983).
29. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 457 (emphasis deleted). One observer has described Justice Wilson
as "the most theoretically inclined of the Justices" sitting on the Court when it decided
Chisholm. See Fletcher, supra note 28, at 1056. The rich, separate opinions of Justices Ire-
dell and Wilson and Chief Justice Jay have produced interesting analyses offering different
perspectives of Chisholm. See, e.g., C. JACOSs, supra note 20, at 41-55; Engdahl, Immunity
and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L REv. 1, 7-10 (1972);
Gibbons, supra note 26, at 1920-26.
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If Chisholm was "the most celebrated case of the pre-Marshall
period," 30 that notoriety did not come from its success in establish-
ing constitutional doctrine. According to one commentator, the
Court in Chisholm made two mistakes.3 1 First, the Chisholm doc-
trine jeopardized the treasuries of many states. Chisholm was de-
cided at a time when "the states had been playing fast and loose in
fiscal matters for years, '3 2 particularly with respect to their sub-
stantial debts accumulated during the Revolutionary War.3 3 Sec-
ond, Justice Wilson's opinion included strong nationalist lan-
guage3 4  that alarmed those who feared a powerful federal
judiciary.35
This combination of practical and philosophical objections pro-
vided the binding of interests usually lacking when states' rights
advocates sought to challenge the accretion of national power dur-
ing the early period of constitutional development. 6 Put simply,
the Court had overreached in Chisholm. It had established a deci-
sively nationalistic position when the political leaders of the day
largely had chosen a compromise between the polar approaches to
judicial federalism.
30. C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 46.
31. See R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 2, at 35.
32. Id. at 34.
33. Id.; see Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821) (opinion of Mar-
shall, C.J.); L. TRmE, supra note 2, § 3-35, at 130; 1 C. WARREN, supra note 26, at 99;
Fletcher, supra note 28, at 1058. The flurry of Chisholm-type litigation that was pending in
federal courts at the time confirms the condition of state financial affairs. See C. JACOBS,
supra note 20, at 43-64. Professor Jacobs, however, challenges the conventional wisdom that
Chisholm jeopardized state monetary stability. See id. at 69-70.
34. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
35. R. McCLOSKEY, supra note 2, at 35; see C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 71; Fletcher,
supra note 28, at 1058. Charles Warren has downplayed the philosophical opposition to
Chisholm, arguing that "the real source of the attack on the Chisholm case was the very
concrete fear" of impending litigation on war debts in the federal courts. See 1 C. WARREN,
supra note 26, at 99.
36. Professor Jacobs has described well the paradoxical difficulty faced by states'
rightists:
The history of the Supreme Court is replete with specific decisions having both
immediate incidence upon particular states and wide import for "states'
rights." Although such decisions normally evoke intense local, and occasionally
sectional, opposition, the reaction of states not immediately and practically af-
fected has often been disappointing to those that are.
C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 57; see R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 2, at 59.
[Vol. 27:449
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The public response was swift. Within days of the Court's deci-
sion, Congress began considering a constitutional amendment that
would reverse the Court's holding.37 Two years later, in early 1795,
the eleventh amendment was ratified.38 The Court's first signifi-
cant attempt to prescribe the judicial relationship between the na-
tion and the states thus became the first decision to be reversed by
constitutional amendment.
B. A Swing to the Opposite Extreme of States' Rights: Hans v.
Louisiana
The Court's misstep in Chisholm set a pattern of sorts for its
development of eleventh amendment doctrine. The Court's expan-
sive reading of article III in Chisholm was more than matched by
its disobedience of the eleventh amendment in Hans v. Louisi-
ana.39 Like Chisholm, Hans involved a suit in federal court against
a state for money due on a contract-in this case, interest on
bonds issued by the state legislature.4 ° If anything, however, the
case for federal jurisdiction seemed far more respectable in Hans
because, unlike Chisholm, the litigation involved a federal
37. C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 64-65; Fletcher, supra note 28, at 1058-59. According to
Charles Warren, "The [Chisholm] decision fell upon the country with a profound shock." 1
C. WARREN, supra note 26, at 96. The Supreme Court has accepted that reading of public
reaction. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 11 (1890). Judge Gibbons, however, has challenged vigorously what he terms the
"profound shock thesis." See Gibbons, supra note 26, at 1926.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Congress also enacted the first anti-injunction statute less
than two weeks after the Court decided Chisholm. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat.
333, 334 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982)). That statute prohibited any
Supreme Court Justice from issuing injunctions "to stay proceedings in any court of a
state." Id. § 5, 1 Stat. at 335. Although the timing of this statute seems to indicate that it
also was a legislative reaction to Chisholm, most commentators agree that this characteriza-
tion would be incorrect. See Comment, Anti-Suit Injunctions Between State and Federal
Courts, 32 U. CHL L. REV. 471, 481 n.46 (1965) (listing the relevant commentaries). Out-
wardly, the anti-injunction act and the eleventh amendment both clearly seem to reflect a
sentiment that state governments should maintain a significant measure of independence.
See Weinberg, supra note 6, at 1197, 1199. Professor Mayton has argued, however, that the
anti-injunction act may not have been motivated by any concern of federalism. See Mayton,
Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-Injunction Statute, 78 COLUM L. REv. 330 (1978). Al-
though these commentators disagree concerning Congress' motivation, all seem to concede
that the legislative history of the original anti-injunction act likely will remain obscure.
39. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
40. Id. at 1-3.
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constitutional claim. Instead of simply alleging a common law
breach of contract, as the plaintiff in Chisholm had done, the
plaintiff in Hans claimed that the state had repudiated its obliga-
tions under the bonds in violation of the contract clause of the
United States Constitution.41 Federal jurisdiction seemed appro-
priate in Hans not only because the involvement of a constitu-
tional claim placed the case within the heart of the federal judicial
power, but also because the eleventh amendment exception to that
power did not bar the suit expressly. Hans had sued his own state,
and the eleventh amendment applies to litigation against a state
only when brought by "Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State. '42
Although the Court in Hans readily acknowledged that the text
of both article III and the eleventh amendment pointed toward the
presence of federal jurisdiction, 43 the justices denigrated that con-
clusion as deriving solely from the "letter" of the Constitution.44
The Court maintained that to accept jurisdiction in Hans would
create the "anomalous result" of subjecting states to federal suits
brought by their own citizens, while protecting them from suits by
noncitizens.45 The Court thus rejected the textual interpretation in
favor of what the justices presumed to be the intent underlying the
amendment-denial to the federal courts of any power to entertain
suits by individuals against the states without the consent of the
state being sued.46
41. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see 134 U.S. at 3.
42. See supra note 4.
43. See 134 U.S. at 10.
44. Id. at 15.
45. Id. at 10. The Court also noted that a literal reading of the eleventh amendment
would allow a state to close its courts to a citizen-claimant by maintaining its sovereign
immunity, but the state would be unable to prevent that claimant from seeking recovery in
a federal court. Id.
46. Id. at 12. The validity of the Court's assumption concerning the intent underlying the
eleventh amendment is open to question. Readers of the opinion need not accept the
Court's implicit conclusion that the provision merely represented a drafting mistake. One
possible construction, for example, is that the drafters of the eleventh amendment simply
did not intend "to answer all the evils" generated by Chisholm. See Engdahl, supra note 29,
at 31.
Professor Fletcher, however, has posited a more sophisticated reading of the eleventh
amendment. See Fletcher, supra note 28, at 1033-38. Professor Fletcher began with the uni-
versally-shared premise that Congress intended the eleventh amendment to overturn the
result in Chisholm. Unlike many commentators, however, he noted the result in Chisholm
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In rejecting the literal reading of the eleventh amendment, the
Court seemed haunted by the ghost of Chisholm. Acceptance of
jurisdiction in Hans, the Court feared, would be a "result... no
less startling and unexpected than was the . . decision [in
Chisholm].'47 The justices believed that in Chisholm the Court
had been "more swayed by a close observance of the letter of the
Constitution," in disregard of "history and experience and the es-
tablished order of things. '48 The justices resolved not to repeat
that mistake.
In a fundamental sense, however, the Court in Hans followed the
same path it had taken in Chisholm. Once again, the justices had
moved too far toward a polar approach to judicial federalism-this
time toward the states' rights extreme rather than the nationalist
extreme. Once again they had left public sentiment behind. The
"established order of things" evoked in Hans had changed dramat-
ically with the Civil War and Reconstruction, and federalism had
with care. In Chisholm, Professor Fletcher noted, the Court held that article I allows fed-
eral jurisdiction over any case between a state and citizens of another state. This provision,
under the Court's interpretation, predicates jurisdiction solely on the status of the parties.
In Professor Fletcher's view, Congress intended in its eleventh amendment response to
Chisholm to correct that reading of the state-citizen clause. The amendment, according to
Professor Fletcher, "was intended to require that the state-citizen diversity clause of article
III be construed to confer federal jurisdiction only over disputes in which the state was a
plaintiff." Id. at 1035. Professor Fletcher concluded that the eleventh amendment simply
"limited [the] grant of jurisdiction" by the state-citizen clause; it "forbade nothing." Id.
Professor Fletcher's reading of the eleventh amendment eliminates the anomaly that the
Court perceived in Hans because, under his interpretation, the amendment does not affect
suits, such as Hans, that assert federal questions and thus come within an independent head
of the judicial power.
Professor Field also has offered a construction of the eleventh amendment that explains
the anomaly perceived in Hans. She argued that Congress intended the eleventh amend-
ment to correct the mistaken assumption in Chisholm that article I abrogated state sover-
eign immunity. Congress did not intend the eleventh amendment itself to constitutionalize
that immunity, according to Professor Field. See Field, supra note 26, at 536-46. For a
useful summary of several competing theories of eleventh amendment construction ad-
vanced by commentators in recent years, see M. RnnISH, supra note 19, at 141-54.
47. 134 U.S. at 11. This concern had a practical basis that parallels the historical setting
of the public response to Chisholm. At the time, Louisiana was only one of a number of
southern states that wished to repudiate their revenue bonds in apparent violation of the
contract clause of the Constitution. To make this repudiation effective, Louisiana had to
seek to foreclose federal jurisdiction to consider the constitutional challenges that bondhold-
ers could use to enforce these obligations. See Fletcher, supra note 28, at 1087-88; Gibbons,
supra note 26, at 1998-2002.
48. 134 U.S. at 12, 14.
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been fundamentally redefined, albeit extrajudicially. The Recon-
struction amendments to the Constitution reflected these changes
by providing a federal role for the protection of individual rights
from actions taken by the states.49 Congressional legislation also
reflected these changes, particularly enactments that paralleled the
constitutional movement in protecting the civil rights of private
citizens against state action.5 0 These modifications in the constitu-
tional structure and the state-citizen relationship necessitated a
corresponding change in the concept of judicial federalism. To en-
sure enforcement of these newly-pronounced federal rights, Con-
gress in 1875 enacted a general federal question statute, thereby
securing a federal forum for the adjudication of these rights.5 In
short, judicial federalism had been restructured to accommodate
the post-Civil War perception of the nation-state relationship.
In Hans, however, the Court was not ready to acknowledge this
structural shift. In fact, the Slaughter-House Cases,52 in which the
Court first had interpreted the Reconstruction amendments, al-
ready had illustrated the Court's reluctance. 3 In those cases, the
Court had strained to limit the substantive rights created by the
amendments-rights which federal courts would be asked to en-
force against the states. 4 By limiting those rights, the Court was
49. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV. Professor Orth has observed that the Reconstruc-
tion Era was "the first time in history [that] amendments decreased the power of the states
and increased the power of the national government." Orth, The Interpretation of the Elev-
enth Amendment, 1798-1908: A Case Study of Judicial Power, 1983 U. ILL. L.F. 423, 432
(1983).
50. The most prominent of these Reconstruction Era statutes was the Act of Apr. 20,
1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
51. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. (part 3) 470, 470 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1982)). The general federal question statute was the culmination of this expansion-
ary period of federal jurisdiction. See Schenkier, supra note 10, at 253-55. Earlier in the
Reconstruction Era, Congress had taken other steps to expand federal jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, Congress had authorized removal to federal court if a person litigating in state court
claimed that the state court could not enforce his civil rights. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31,
§ 3, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982)). In addition, Congress had granted
federal jurisdiction in cases that involved alleged deprivations of civil rights. Act of Apr. 20,
1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1982)).
52. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
53. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 408; L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 7-2.
54. G. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 408. Professor Tribe has argued that, in the Slaughter-
House Cases, the Court "quickly dismantled" the goal of those who had drafted the Recon-
struction amendments. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 7-2, at 418.
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attempting to protect the pre-Civil War conception of federalism,
which represented the "established order of things," against the
claim that the basic nation-state relationship had been changed.55
In its approach to the federal judiciary's role in monitoring the re-
lationship between states and their citizens, therefore, Hans repre-
sents the jurisdictional counterpart of the Slaughter-House Cases.
In both decisions the Court sought to preserve a system of state
autonomy that no longer retained vitality.56
Neither decision endured. Within a generation, the Slaughter-
House Cases had yielded to the economic due process orientation
of the Court, symbolized by Lochner.57 Even after Lochner, how-
ever, the expansive reading of the eleventh amendment established
in Hans appeared to block any systematic attempt to invoke the
reinvigorated substantive rights delineated in the fourteenth
amendment.8 Because the Court's stance in Hans was inconsistent
with the activist judicial role prescribed in Lochner, it needed
alteration.
55. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81-82. Justice Miller explained the Court's stance in the
Slaughter-House Cases:
[W]e do not see in [the Reconstruction] amendments any purpose to destroy
the main features of the general system. Under the pressure of all the excited
feeling growing out of the war, our statesmen have still believed that the exis-
tence of the States with powers for domestic and local government, including
the regulation of civil rights-the rights of person and of property-was essen-
tial to the perfect working of our complex form of government, though they
have thought proper to impose additional limitations on the States, and to
confer additional power on that of the Nation.
Id. at 82; see A. BicKEL, THE MORArrY or CONsENT 45 (1975).
56. The kinship between the two decisions, however, should not be overdone. The Court
in the Slaughter-House Cases was closely divided, and the dissenting opinions were sharp.
Hans, on the other hand, produced unanimity. The Slaughter-House Cases, therefore, rep-
resented a more contested and controversial reading of the Reconstruction amendments
than Hans represented of the eleventh amendment. Underscoring this point is the fact that
Justice Bradley, who wrote for the Court in Hans, dissented in the Slaughter-House Cases.
57. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text; G. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 409; L.
TRIE, supra note 2, § 7-3, at 421.
58. See L. TRiBE, supra note 2, § 3-35, at 132. In Lochner, for example, a criminal defend-
ant attempted to invoke substantive rights to overturn a prosecution in state court. See
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 45-47 (1905).
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C. Back to Nationalism: Ex Parte Young and Siler v. Louisville
& Nashville Railroad
The necessary alteration came in Ex Parte Young,59 in which the
Court ensured that Hans would not eclipse the Lochner vision.
Young had followed a rather unconventional route to the Supreme
Court.60 Like other cases in the Lochner prototype, however, it in-
volved a challenge by a business entity to the constitutionality of a
state regulatory system. The State argued in Young that the elev-
enth amendment immunized it from such challenges in federal
court. Under the Hans doctrine, the State's position seems reason-
able because when state officials enforce a statute, the state in real-
ity acts in its sovereign capacity.61 The Court, however, answered
that the officials lacked authority to use the State's name to en-
force an unconstitutional statute,6 2 explaining:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a
violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding
under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior
59. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
60. Young came to the Supreme Court on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by
Edward T. Young, the Attorney General of Minnesota. The writ challenged a lower federal
court judgment finding Attorney General Young guilty of contempt. The alleged contempt
had occurred when Young had filed an action in state court to enforce a state rate regulation
statute. The federal court had entered an injunction just the day before, which had forbid-
den Young from enforcing the statute, in response to a constitutional challenge by railroad
company shareholders. Id. at 126-34.
61. See id. at 159. Indeed, if a court finds that enforcement of a state regulatory scheme
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, as the Court did find in
Young, id. at 145-49, the Court also must find, at least implicitly, that the enforcement
constitutes state action. See L. TRmE, supra note 2, § 3-39, at 146. Despite the logic of the
State's position in Young, the Court after Hans was inconsistent in responding to similar
claims of immunity by state officials. See C. JAcoBs, supra note 20, at 106-38.
62. 209 U.S. at 159. In the Court's view, the injunction did not affect the State in its
sovereign or governmental capacity because "the officer is simply prohibited from doing an
act which he had no legal right to do." Id. With this approach to the State's claim of immu-
nity, the Court was able to avoid deciding whether, as a matter of formal law, the fourteenth
amendment affected the scope of the eleventh amendment. See id. at 150.
The Court subsequently addressed an aspect of that question squarely in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In that case, the Court held that "the Eleventh Amendment and
the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, see Hans v. Louisiana, . . . are neces-
sarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
456. In essence, the Court's holding means that Congress, when enforcing the fourteenth
amendment, can authorize private suits in federal court against states or state officials that
otherwise would violate the eleventh amendment. Id.
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authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of
his official or representative character and is subjected in his
person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State
has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility
to the supreme authority of the United States.8 3
In this respect, the Young doctrine represents the jurisdictional
counterpart to Lochner, opening the courthouse door to active fed-
eral control over state economic policy.6 4
Young, however, did not offer a complete jurisdictional comple-
ment to the substantive mandate charted in Lochner. Because
state and federal law often overlap in a federal system, an action
taken by a state official often poses substantial questions arising
under both state and federal law.65 In such circumstances, a pri-
vate party adversely affected by the state action can be expected to
join the state and federal claims in one lawsuit. To fulfill the prom-
ise in Young of a federal forum to challenge unconstitutional state
63. 209 U.S. at 159-60.
64. See C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 142, 144-45; Duker, Mr. Justice Rufus W. Peckham
and the Case of Ex Parte Young: Lochnerizing Munn v. Illinois, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rv. 539;
Weinberg, supra note 6, at 1199.
Justice Harlan, who wrote dissenting opinions in both Young and Lochner, did not miss
the importance of Young to the ambition of Lochner.
[The Young doctrine], if firmly established, would work a radical change in our
governmental system. It would inaugurate a new era in the American judicial
system and in the relations of the National and state governments. It would
enable the subordinate Federal courts to supervise and control the official ac-
tion of the States as if they were "dependencies" or provinces. It would place
the States of the Union in a condition of inferiority never dreamed of when the
Constitution was adopted or when the Eleventh Amendment was made a part
of the Supreme Law of the Land.
Lochner, 209 U.S. at 175 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan was not alone in his dismay
concerning Young. In fact, one commentator has stated that the "outcry was reminiscent of
that following the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia." C. JACOBS, supra note 20, at 146.
The result of the protest after Young, however, was considerably more modest than the
constitutional amendment that resulted from the protest after Chisholm. Congress failed to
adopt proposals that would have deprived lower federal courts of jurisdiction to grant in-
junctions against state officials charged with enforcing state statutes. Id. at 147. Congress
responded in a limited way in 1910, enacting legislation that, while it remained fully effec-
tive, mandated three-judge district courts for certain categories of suits that were authorized
by Young. Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2284 (1982)); see C. JAcoBs, supra note 20, at 148-49; Hufstedler, supra note 21, at
848.
65. See Chisum, The Tensions of Judicial Federalism, 33 STAN. L. Rav. 1161, 1179 (1981);
Schenkier, supra note 10, at 245.
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actions, a lower federal court considering the party's federal claim
also would need the power to determine the related state claim.
Without this power, the litigant would be encouraged to seek re-
dress in the state court system, which would have jurisdiction to
resolve both claims.6 To allow this practical result would undo the
Court's theoretical tour de force in Young, which was designed to
open the federal forum to such litigants.
Just one year after Young, the Court in Siler v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad6 7 cemented the power of lower federal courts to
entertain state claims in such cases. Siler, like Young, fit the Loch-
ner paradigm. In Siler, a railroad company had sued in federal
court to enjoin enforcement of a rate regulation order issued by the
Kentucky Railroad Commission."8 The railroad had charged not
only that the order had violated the federal Constitution, but also
that the state commission had violated its enabling act. 9 The
Court upheld the lower federal court's decision to invalidate the
commission's order, grounding its ruling solely on the state law
claim. The Court held that federal jurisdiction could rest on the
federal question raised in the railroad's constitutional claim, and
that once the court had obtained jurisdiction in this manner, it
could decide all questions of law presented in the case.7 0 The Court
added that, in view of its usual preference for avoiding unnecessary
66. See Brown, supra note 5, at 357; Schenkier, supra note 10, at 255-56. State courts
have power to resolve cases that raise federal questions unless Congress has provided exclu-
sive jurisdiction in a federal court. See M. RDISH, supra note 19, at 109-15.
67. 213 U.S. 175 (1909). Chief Justice Marshall had laid the groundwork for Siler in Os-
born v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824):
[W]hen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the
constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of
Congress to give the [lower federal courts] jurisdiction of that cause, although
other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it.
Id. at 823. In Chief Justice Marshall's view, this reading of the federal judicial power under
the Constitution was a functional necessity. According to Chief Justice Marshall, few cases
exist for which "every part ... depends on the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." Id. at 820. If the presence of state law questions defeated federal judicial power,
Chief Justice Marshall suggested, federal question jurisdiction would be a practical nullity.
See id. at 819-20.
68. 213 U.S. at 176-77.
69. Id. at 190-91.
70. Id. at 191. The grant in Siler of jurisdiction over pendent state claims was broad, but
not unlimited. Under Siler, the Court could not take jurisdiction if "the Federal question
[was] merely colorable or fraudulently set up for the mere purpose of endeavoring to give
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constitutional decisions, resolution of mixed claim cases on state
law grounds was preferable. 1 Pendent jurisdiction over related
state claims, the Court reasoned, allowed it to do just that.
In Siler, the Court completed its basic framework for active fed-
eral judicial review of state economic regulation. In this frame-
work, the expansive interpretation of the fourteenth amendment
due process clause embodied in Lochner provided federal courts
with the substantive mandate, and the general grant of jurisdiction
over federal questions embodied in the Judiciary Act of 1875 pro-
vided them with the jurisdictional mandate. Young and Siler com-
pleted the picture. In Young, the Court minimized problems of
sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment, while in Siler
it ushered in an expansive rule of pendent jurisdiction which al-
lowed federal courts to overturn state regulations on the basis of
state law if the case also involved a bona fide federal question.
Justice Peckham, who wrote the majority opinions in Lochner,
Young, and Siler, carefully had assembled a model of judicial re-
view of state action in just four years. Like the Court's prior view
of judicial federalism in Hans, however, the Lochner-Young-Siler
framework did not endure. On the judicial federalism spectrum,
the Court again had moved to the opposite polar position. The Su-
preme Court had disregarded concerns for state autonomy, includ-
ing both substantive concerns relating to the regulatory policy
judgments by state legislatures and jurisdictional concerns relating
to the maintenance of a limited role for federal courts.
The Court's push to a nationalist extreme is illustrated most
graphically in Siler itself. After Justice Peckham sustained the
federal court's jurisdiction to hear the state law claim, he ruled
that the state railroad commission had violated its enabling act by
issuing the rate regulation order,7 2 even though the enabling act
never had received an interpretation from the highest state court.73
While the lack of a state court interpretation was not necessarily
the court jurisdiction." Id. at 191-92. The Court later tightened the restrictions on its exer-
cise of pendent jurisdiction. See infra note 75.
71. Id. at 193. The classic statement of the doctrine prescribing avoidance of constitu-
tional questions came after the Court decided Siler. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,
346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
72. Siler, 213 U.S. at 193-98.
73. See id. at 179-80, 194.
19861
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:449
disabling, Justice Peckham exacerbated the difficulty by failing to
use the customary tools in arriving at his "interpretation" of the
state statute in Siler. By showing little regard for the statutory
text, the discernible legislative intent, the state commission's inter-
pretation, or the precedent from the Kentucky courts, he betrayed
a disregard for the expositors of state law. In effect, Justice
Peckham engaged in a wholly independent interpretation of the
statute, and he found it wanting.74 His opinion offered nothing
more than the free-wheeling judicial approach of Lochner in state
law clothing. Indeed, if Justice Peckham had invoked federal
norms to constrict state autonomy, as he had done in Lochner, his
approach would have been far less offensive to notions of judicial
federalism. Like other judicial federalism approaches before it, the
Young-Siler jurisdictional model needed adjustment.
D. A Position Between the Extremes: Pullman Abstention
The Court's principal moderating response to the Young-Siler
jurisdictional model came several decades later in Railroad Com-
mission v. Pullman Co."5 In Pullman, just as in Siler, a private
74. The thrust of the Court's position in Siler was that, to exercise the "enormous power"
of issuing a general tariff of rates, a state agency must trace its authority to an explicit
statutory grant. Id. at 193-94. This rule of construction came from the Court, not from
Kentucky law.
75. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Later, the Court further moderated Justice Peckham's jurisdic-
tional model by refining the eleventh amendment doctrine of Young and the pendent juris-
diction doctrine of Siler. The principal modification of the Young doctrine, at least before
Pennhurst II, occurred in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), in which the Court lim-
ited the application of Young to suits seeking prospective relief. Id. at 664. The Court in
Edelman held that the eleventh amendment prohibited equitable restitution awards against
state officials in their official capacities. Id. at 664-67.
The principal modification of the Siler doctrine came in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715 (1966). In Gibbs, the Court essentially framed a three-part test to determine
whether a federal court has power to decide a state claim under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. To allow adjudication of the state claim under the test, the Court held that (1)
the federal claim must be substantial enough to convey subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the
state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact; and (3) one
ordinarily must expect to try the two claims in one judicial proceeding. Id. at 725. Even if
the claims in a particular case pass this test, the Court suggested in Gibbs that a federal
court need not exercise pendent jurisdiction because that jurisdictional concept "is a doc-
trine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right." Id. at 726. According to the Court, the doctrine's
justification "lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to liti-
gants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over
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party had filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging an order is-
sued by a state railroad commission. The complaints in both Pull-
man and Siler had asserted both federal constitutional claims and
pendent state claims alleging that the railroad commission's order
was not authorized by the commission's enabling act.76 In Suler,
the Court had forged ahead, asserting pendent jurisdiction over the
state claim and invalidating the state commission's order on that
basis. In Pullman, however, Justice Frankfurter took a more care-
ful look at the state claim before deciding whether to resolve it.
Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that the Court had jurisdiction
to resolve the state claim, and he sympathized with the preference
expressed in Slier for avoiding "sensitive" constitutional decisions
by first deciding the state claims.7 7 He refused to decide the state
claim in Pullman, however, because he felt ill-equipped to do so.
Unlike the Court in Siler, which prior to Erie had decided the
state law question based on its own preferences concerning social
policy, the Court in Pullman recognized its duty under the Erie
doctrine to apply state law to adjudicate the state claim.78 When
Justice Frankfurter examined the state enabling statute in Pull-
man, he found that the commission's authority to issue the order
state claims." Id.; see C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 105-07; Schenkier, supra note 10, at 248-
51.
Recently, the Court has shown signs that it will take a restrictive approach to pendent
jurisdiction. A primary example is its hesitance to allow use of the doctrine to join pendent
parties in federal court. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978);
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Schenkier, supra note 10, at 247, 275-87.
76. Pullman, however, differed from Siler and Young in the nature of the state action at
issue. Typical of their day, Siler and Young involved challenges to economic regulations.
See R. McCLosKEY, supra note 2, at 104-05. Pullman, on the other hand, raised the issue of
racial discrimination, which was to become a focus of the Court's attention in the post-
World War II period. See id. at 180-81. In Pullman, the Texas Railroad Commission had
required that Pullman conductors, rather than porters, control sleeping cars operated on
railway lines within the State. At the time, Pullman porters were black, and conductors
were white. The order prompted challenges from the Pullman Company, the affected rail-
roads, and the porters. See 312 U.S. at 497-98.
77. 312 U.S. at 498.
78. Id. at 499. In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court had turned away
from the most troubling aspect of Siler-the disregard of state law in resolving state claims.
In Erie, the Court explicitly had rejected the concept of general federal common law, hold-
ing that state law applies unless federal law controls the particular matter. Id. at 78. The
Erie doctrine thus obliges federal courts to apply state law in resolving state claims within
its pendent jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
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was "far from clear. ' 9 Justice Frankfurter's proffered solution,
which has come to be known as Pullman abstention, was for the
federal district court to stay the case while the parties resorted to
the state judiciary for resolution of the state law claim.80 As later
refined by the Court, Pullman abstention allows a plaintiff chal-
lenging state action either to assert the federal constitutional claim
in state court or to preserve the federal claim for ultimate resolu-
tion in federal court if the state ruling does not terminate the
controversy."1
Pullman abstention is a valuable variation on Siler. As distilled
over the years, the Pullman doctrine prescribes abstention "when
79. 312 U.S. at 499. The federal district court had held that the state enabling act did not
authorize the commission's order. See Pullman Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 33 F. Supp. 675
(W.D. Tex. 1940) (per curiam), rev'd, 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Justice Frankfurter did not ques-
tion that opinion, but he was diffident in his evaluation of the state law issue:
Reading the Texas statutes and the Texas decisions as outsiders without spe-
cial competence in Texas law, we would have little confidence in our indepen-
dent judgment regarding the application of that law to the present situation.
The lower court did deny that the Texas statutes sustained the Commission's
assertion of power. And this represents the view of an able and experienced
circuit judge of the circuit which includes Texas and of two capable district
judges trained in Texas law. Had we or they no choice in the matter but to
decide what is the law of the state, we should hesitate long before rejecting
their forecast of Texas law. But no matter how seasoned the judgment of the
district court may be, it cannot escape being a forecast rather than a
determination.
312 U.S. at 499.
Professor Field, commenting on Pullman, suggested that the state decisional law inter-
preting the enabling statute was "relatively unambiguous." See Field, supra note 12, at 1078
n.23. Judge Hufstedler raised a more cynical argument in favor of the federal district court's
decision to adjudicate the pendent state claim. Judge Hufstedler asked rhetorically, but
pointedly- "How likely was it in 1941 that the Texas courts would hold that the Commission
did not have authority under state law to adopt rules discriminating against black porters in
favor of white conductors?" See Hufstedler, supra note 21, at 861.
80. 312 U.S. at 501-02; see supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. As a predicate to
staying the federal action, the Court found that Texas law appeared "to furnish easy and
ample means for determining the Commission's authority." Id. at 501. The Court also as-
sumed that the state judiciary's "methods for securing a definitive ruling in the state courts
[would] be pursued with full protection of the constitutional claim." Id.
81. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). In
England, the Court explained why the Pullman abstention doctrine gave this option to the
challenger: "There are fundamental objections to any conclusion that a litigant who has
properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal constitu-
tional claims can be compelled, without his consent and through no fault of his own, to
accept instead a state court's determination of those claims." Id. at 415 (footnote omitted).
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a federal court is faced with an unclear issue of state law whose
resolution might avoid or modify a federal constitutional ques-
tion. 's2 Pullman abstention thus reflects a more solicitous view of
state autonomy because it recognizes "the role of state courts as
the final expositors of state law."83
This structural recognition carries a functional justification as
well, because Pullman abstention allocates issues between state
and federal courts in a way that optimizes each forum's expertise.8
4
Furthermore, although Justice Frankfurter's worry about the effect
of an unconstrained Young-Siler model on the "reign of law"s
perhaps was exaggerated, it hardly was chimerical. Especially in
the context of modern public law litigation, the interpretation of
state governing statutes poses subtle problems for a court. The
task of intuiting how the highest state court would approach these
issues is not always easy for federal judges. Regardless of how a
federal court decides an uncertain issue of state law, an incorrect
prediction subsequently "supplanted by a controlling decision of a
state court"' has an unfortunate effect on the workability of the
judicial federalism system. At times, these incorrect predictions are
profoundly damaging.87
82. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 590 (1977); see Hawaii
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984). In an early consideration of Pullman ab-
stention, Professor Wright described the doctrine as one of "comity rather than of jurisdic-
tion, and [one which] concerns fundamentally the timing of federal decision rather than the
propriety of any federal decision at all." Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37
TFx L. REv. 815, 825 (1959).
83. England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964); see Pull-
man, 312 U.S. at 500; Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation of Judicial
Power, 27 VAND. L. Rv. 1107, 1114 (1974); Field, supra note 12, at 1084. In this way, the
doctrine allows the Court to control a long-standing problem of judicial federalism-namely,
conflicting decisions of local law offered by state and federal courts. See Bezanson, supra, at
1115-16. This was the problem that had led to the Court's undoing in Erie of the regime of
federal common law that had prevailed under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
84. See Bezanson, supra note 83, at 1135-36, Field, supra note 12, at 1083; Kurland, To-
ward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24
F.R.D. 481, 487-88 (1959).
85. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500.
86. Id.
87. Regardless of the result of a federal court's ruling on an unclear state claim, an incor-
rect ruling causes the judicial federalism system to malfunction. If the court erroneously
sustains the state claim, it will have interfered needlessly with a valid state policy. If the
court wrongly rejects the claim, on the other hand, it needlessly will have decided a
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In spite of the sound rationale that underlies Pullman absten-
tion, the doctrine justifiably has engendered a great deal of criti-
cism. Most fundamentally, critics have argued that the doctrine
usurps Congress' plenary power to delineate the jurisdiction of
lower federal courts. These critics challenge Justice Frankfurter for
allowing judicial abstention from cases that Congress has required
federal courts to hear under the general federal question statute."8
Some commentators also argue that even if the federal courts do
have power to regulate their jurisdiction in this manner, Pullman
abstention is not a sound mechanism for doing so. According to
these commentators, Justice Frankfurter invoked abstract values
of federalism that his doctrine fails to advance.8 e The most telling
criticism of Pullman abstention, however, is functional. Virtually
all observers acknowledge that litigants pay a high price when
Pullman abstention mandates severance of cases for partial adjudi-
cation in the state and federal judicial systems.90 The financial
burden imposed by the delay and expense of Pullman abstention
can be so great in some cases that it forecloses a federal forum for
a litigant seeking adjudication of a constitutional right.9 1
Although these criticisms to some extent ring true, Pullman ab-
stention has endured for good reason. Justice Frankfurter's call for
constitutional question despite the strong federal policy against doing so. See id.; Field
supra note 82, at 590.
88. This challenge to Pullman abstention was voiced early. See Kurland, supra note 84,
at 489. Only recently, however, has it received its most forceful articulation. See Redish,
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71
(1984). The usual, but not wholly satisfying, response to this criticism is that Pullman ab-
stention only delays the exercise of jurisdiction. C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 306; Field,
supra note 12, at 1086-87; Redish, supra, at 90.
89. See Chisum, supra note 65, at 1179; Hufstedler, supra note 21, at 860-63.
90. See, e.g., Chisum, supra note 65, at 1179; Field, supra note 12, at 1095. As an example
of the cost of Pullman, Professor Field cited the litigation in England v. Louisiana Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), in which the Court established the procedure for
using Pullman abstention. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. In England, Professor
Field reports, a final decision on the merits came nine years after the complaint was filed
and five years after the federal court ordered abstention. Field, supra note 12, at 1085-86.
91. See Field, supra note 12, at 1085-87; Redish, supra note 88, at 90. In roughly half the
states, a statutory procedure ameliorates these costs. Under this procedure, a federal court
can retain the case and certify questions of state law to the highest state court for an advi-
sory opinion. Plaintiffs are not required to complete their litigation in the state court sys-
tem. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 313-15; Note, Certification Statutes: Engineering a
Solution to the Pullman Abstention Delay, 59 NoTRE DAMS L. REV. 1339 (1984).
[Vol. 27:449
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
restraint in federal resolution of state law issues is wise counsel.
More fundamentally, Pullman offers a solution to a problem that
has haunted the Court since Chisholm because it offers a mecha-
nism that, from both a structural and a functional standpoint, ap-
propriately allocates public law litigation between the federal and
state judicial systems. The Pullman doctrine avoids the polar ex-
tremes of the judicial federalism spectrum. Instead, it allows the
Court to move flexibly and moderately to assess judicial federalism
implications on a case-by-case basis. Pullman abstention is the
culmination of an evolutionary process. It is also a compromise,
pure and simple.2
The overriding value of Pullman abstention to the concept of
judicial federalism is that, properly applied,93 it keeps the federal
forum operating within its capacity. Under the Young-Siler-
Pullman jurisdictional model for resolving dual claims against
state officials, federal courts normally resolve controversies on the
basis of state law and then, if necessary, on the basis of federal
constitutional law. That system functions properly only if the fed-
eral court is confident of its ability to ascertain and to apply gov-
erning state law. In the limited number of cases in which state law
is "far from clear,"' 4 however, a federal shot in the dark on the
state law issue is hardly desirable. Federal judicial control of the
manner in which state officials perform their official duties is sensi-
tive business, and a federal court should hesitate to proceed if it is
92. See Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Ac-
tivist Era, 80 HARV. L. REV. 604, 606 (1967).
93. Pullman abstention, of course, may not always receive proper application. For exam-
ple, the doctrine's "lack of definition," see Kurland, supra note 84, at 488-89, and the un-
predictable results that stem from the doctrine's flexibility, see Field, The Uncertain Na-
ture of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 683, 697 (1981), may cause problems
in application. Professor Field also has found that, at times, federal courts have misused
Pullman abstention. These misuses, according to Professor Field, involve invocation of the
doctrine for reasons other than clarification of state law. See Field, supra note 82, at 602-04.
Indeed, this charge can be leveled against the use of abstention in Pullman itself. See supra
note 79.
94. See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 499; supra note 79 and accompanying text. The Court has
indicated that Pullman abstention is appropriate only in "narrowly limited special circum-
stances." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967). As the Court has explained many
times, "abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule."
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984) (quoting Colorado River Water
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)); see Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492
(1949); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1943).
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not confident of its resolution of a state law claim. In the unusual
cases envisioned under Pullman, preservation of the federal claim
while the parties litigate the state law issue is a sensible accommo-
dation of federalism values. Used properly, Pullman abstention op-
erates as an essential ultimate regulator of the judicial federalism
system.
III. THE Pennhurst ALTERATION
One astute commentator has observed: "The history of judicial
interpretation of the [eleventh] amendment illustrates in minia-
ture much of the political and legal controversy since the early
days of the Republic." 5 The same may be said of the larger con-
cept of judicial federalism, as the preceding section reflects. The
major Supreme Court decisions that helped design the modern
pattern of judicial federalism were responses to lawsuits that typi-
fied their times. Young and Siler, decided in the first decade of
this century, involved the standard economic due process chal-
lenges to state regulation for which that period has become known.
Pullman was an early racial discrimination case of the type that
was to constitute a staple of the modern Court's diet. 6 Similarly,
the several decisions that constituted the Pennhurst litigation97
arose from a claim that typified, albeit dramatically, the institu-
tional lawsuits against state officials that flourished in many fed-
eral district courts during the 1970's."s As a result, the Court's use
of Pennhurst as the setting for its alteration of judicial federalism
concepts is fitting, in an ironic way.
A. Initial District Court and Circuit Court Consideration
The Pennhurst litigation began in May 1974, when Terri Lee
Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst State School and Hospital
near Philadelphia, filed a class action in federal district court
against the state and county officials responsible for her institu-
95. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 61.
96. See supra notes 59-81 and accompanying text.
97. The ten-year litigation in Pennhurst produced a number of judicial decisions, but this
Article discusses only the principal opinions in detail. See infra notes 99-153 and accompa-
nying text.
98. See supra note 11.
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tionalization. Halderman represented a class of mentally retarded
persons who resided, or who had resided, at Pennhurst. The class'
primary claim was that hospital officials had violated rights se-
cured by state and federal statutes and by the United States
Constitution. 9
Against a backdrop of factual findings that depicted Pennhurst
Hospital as a Gothic nightmare, 00 the district court had no diffi-
culty holding that the State had violated the legal rights of the
mentally retarded residents of Pennhurst.1' 0 At the core of the dis-
trict court's analysis was the belief that, once a state involunta-
rily102 commits retarded persons, it assumes a legal duty to provide
them with habilitation' 5 sufficient to afford them "a reasonable
opportunity to acquire and maintain those life skills necessary to
cope as effectively as their capacities permit. ' 'le4 According to the
district court, the residents' rights to such minimally adequate ha-
bilitation were grounded in the Constitution,'0 5 federal statutes,0
99. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1298, 1300 (E.D.
Pa. 1977), aff'd en banc, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). The district
court granted the United States leave to intervene as a plaintiff in January 1975. Id. at 1301.
100. The district court described the deficiencies of Pennhurst in great detail See id. at
1303-10. Even the State admitted that Pennhurst did not meet minimum state, federal, or
professional standards for the habilitation of its residents. Id. at 1302 & n.14. The district
court's findings of fact followed a thirty-two day bench trial on the issue of liability. Id. at
1298, 1300.
101. Id. at 1313. The court introduced its discussion of the residents' legal claims by not-
ing, ironically, that the state officials before the court apparently shared the primary institu-
tional aims of the residents. According to the court, the State had envisioned closing Penn-
burst and moving the patients to appropriate community facilities by 1980. Id. at 1312. "All
agree," the court concluded, "that institutions such as Pennhurst are inappropriate and in-
adequate for the habilitation of the retarded." Id. at 1313.
102. The district court found that "the notion of voluntariness in connection with admis-
sion as well as in connection with the right to leave Pennhurst is an illusory concept." Id. at
1311.
103. According to the district court, "habilitation" is a "term of art used to refer to that
education, training and care required by retarded individuals to reach their maximum de-
velopment." Id. at 1298.
104. Id. at 1317-18.
105. The court apparently found that the residents received this right under the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 1319. The plaintiffs had alleged viola-
tions of not only the fourteenth amendment, but also the first, eighth, and ninth amend-
ments. See id. at 1298 n.3.
106. The court found a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1982). See 446 F. Supp. at 1323-24.
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and Pennsylvania's Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of
1966107 (MH/MR Act).
To remedy the violations at the hospital, the court ordered the
State to close Pennhurst and to replace it with "suitable commu-
nity living arrangements."10 8 The court also ordered the State to
develop "a written individualized program plan" for each class
member,10 9 as well as "such community services as are necessary to
provide . . . minimally adequate habilitation."" 0 The court ap-
pointed a special master to implement the decree."'
On appeal, the district court's judgment presented the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit with a classic institu-
tional decree that offered a menu of substantive bases.11 2 The diffi-
culty of the case for the court of appeals is demonstrated by the
court's decision to set the appeal for en banc consideration because
the first panel to hear the case had been unable to agree on a ma-
jority opinion."3s The difficult choices facing the court of appeals
involved legal, not factual, issues. Indeed, the state and county offi-
cials did not challenge the district court's factual findings concern-
ing what the Third Circuit called "the abominable conditions to
which Pennhurst residents have been subjected. '"" 4 Instead, their
challenge focused on the legal bases for, and scope of, the decree.
In particular, the hospital officials challenged the district court's
107. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969); see 446 F. Supp. at 1322-23.
108. 446 F. Supp. at 1325-26. The court found that "an institution such as Pennhurst"
could not provide adequate habilitation. Id. at 1318; see id. at 1319-20.
109. Id. at 1326.
110. Id. The court ordered state and county officials to monitor the adequecy of the com-
munity arrangements and services provided under the decree. Id.
111. Id. at 1326. The court found that implementing the decree would be "impossible
without the appointment of a Special Master," whose implementation plan would be subject
to the court's approval. Id.
112. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en
banc), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). Both the district court and the court of appeals refused to
stay the decree pending appeal. See id. at 90; 451 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Pa. 1978), denying
stay of 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The appellate court's refusal to grant a stay
essentially meant that implementation of the district court judgment had continued during
appellate review. See 612 F.2d at 90. Later, the court of appeals issued a partial stay that
disallowed "transfers out of Pennhurst of any resident whose parents or guardian fails to
sign a written consent to such transfer." Id.
113. See 612 F.2d at 90.
114. Id. at 92.
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ruling that institutionalized mentally retarded persons have a legal
right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment. 115
The court of appeals upheld the district court's ruling. The court
found that the right to habilitation articulated by the district court
was protected by a federal statute, the Federal Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975.118 Having
found a proper legal basis for the residents' asserted rights, the
court of appeals had no difficulty concluding that the State had
violated those rights:
[I]t goes almost without saying that Pennhurst, as it was consti-
tuted and operated at the time of the lawsuit, was in flagrant
violation of those rights. The conditions at Pennhurst were un-
sanitary, programming was nonexistent, enforced idleness was
substituted for meaningful habilitation, physical and chemical
restraints were wantonly applied, and overcrowding and under-
staffing were the prevailing and institutional norms."1
The court of appeals supported the district court's mandate for
deinstitutionalization of the State's mentally retarded patients."18
It stopped short, however, of closing Pennhurst.1" 9 According to
the court, the federal and state statutes on which the residents had
115. Id. at 92, 94.
116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1982); see 612 F.2d at 95-100, 104-07. The plaintiffs had
asserted a cause of action under the statute, but the district court had not ruled on that
claim. See id. at 95.
The court of appeals also held that Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act provided an alternative
basis for a right to receive "adequate treatment or habilitation." 612 F.2d at 102. The court
did not indicate, however, whether the state law also required that those services be pro-
vided in the least restrictive setting. The Third Circuit declined to rule on the residents'
claims under the United States Constitution, see id. at 104, and the Federal Rehabilitation
Act, see id. at 107-08.
117. 612 F.2d at 108.
118. The court advised that "deinstitutionalization is the favored approach to habilita-
tion." Id. at 115. In implementing the decree, the court added, the presumption should
favor transfer from Pennhurst. Id.
119. Id. at 114. The court required individualized determinations concerning deinstitu-
tionalization for each patient, explaining
All that we need to recognize is that there may be some individual patients
who, because of advanced age, profound degree of retardation, special needs or
for some other reason, will not be able to adjust to life outside of an institution
and thus will be harmed by such a change.
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grounded their rights did not foreclose all institutionalization of
the mentally retarded.120
B. Initial Supreme Court Consideration: Pennhurst I
Pennhurst Hospital's fortunes finally brightened when the case
made its first trip to the United States Supreme Court. In Penn-
hurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman121 (Pennhurst I), the
Court held that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance Act, on
which the court of appeals had grounded its affirmance of the de-
cree, does not provide institutionalized mentally retarded individu-
als with a judicially enforceable right to habilitation in the least
restrictive environment. 22 The Court interpreted the statute as
simply providing the states with "funding incentives" to improve
the lot of the mentally retarded. 23 As Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion repeatedly emphasized, the Court was hesitant to view the
statute as an attempt to intrude on "traditional state authority" by
imposing "affirmative obligations on the States to fund certain ser-
vices.' 1 24 According to Justice Rehnquist, Congress' failure explic-
itly to enact the rights added to the Court's reluctance, especially
because these rights would "impose massive financial obligations
on the States.' 25 Justice Rehnquist explained:
In no case . . . have we required a State to provide money to
plaintiffs, much less required a State to take on such open-
ended and potentially burdensome obligations as providing "ap-
propriate" treatment in the "least restrictive" environment. And
because this is a suit in federal court, anything but prospective
120. Id. at 114-15. The court warned, however, that "state and federal laws plainly re-
quire that if Pennhurst is to remain open for at least some patients, it must be dramatically
improved so as to provide adequate habilitation." Id. at 116. The district court's decree had
ordered this type of improvement. See 446 F. Supp. at 1328-29.
121. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
122. See id. at 5, 10-11, 15-27; see also supra note 116 and accompanying text (citing the
act and noting the circuit court's reliance on it).
123. Id. at 31.
124. Id. at 16-17 (emphasis by the Court).
125. Id.; see id. at 17, 18, 24-25, 31-32.
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relief would pose serious questions under the Eleventh
Amendment. 126
Having dismantled the foundation of the Third Circuit's affirm-
ance, Justice Rehnquist remanded the case to the court of appeals.
C. Court of Appeals Consideration on Remand
Justice Rehnquist's opinion forced the Third Circuit to face es-
sentially the same choices on remand that it had confronted when
it initially reviewed the case. In a legal sense, the Supreme Court
simply had withdrawn one basis for the plaintiffs' right to treat-
ment. Although the Developmentally Disabled Assistance Act no
longer was available to support a decree against Pennhurst, the
State MH/MR Act, the Federal Rehabilitation Act, and the United
States Constitution remained candidates to support such a decree.
The court chose the state statute.12 7
A convergence of considerations may have led the court of ap-
peals to settle on the state statute. One consideration may have
been the tone of Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in
Pennhurst L Justice Rehnquist left no doubt about his disinclina-
tion to imply broad rights to treatment from federal statutes, and
he gave no signal that the Court stood ready to find a constitu-
tional basis for the district court's institutional decree.128 These
126. Id. at 29-30 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)); see also supra note 75
(describing the expansion of eleventh amendment immunity created by the Court's ruling in
Edelman).
127. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647, 651-56 (3d Cir. 1982)
(en banc), rev'd, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
128. See 451 U.S. at 15-18. Although Justice Blackmun largely agreed with the Court's
interpretation of the Act in Pennhurst I, he wrote a separate opinion. One reason for writ-
ing separately was his desire to disassociate himself from what he considered a strong inti-
mation that a majority of the justices would "not view kindly any future positive holding in
[the] direction" of the plaintiffs' claims. 451 U.S. at 32. Although Justice Blackmun's obser-
vation refers only to the Court's view of the plaintiffs' remaining claims under the Federal
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, it also applies to the
Court's view of the plaintiffs' remaining claims under other federal statutes.
Just a few months after the Third Circuit disposed of the Pennhurst remand, the poten-
tial constitutional basis arguably brightened. In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982),
the Supreme Court did find a due process right for institutionalized, mentally retarded peo-
ple. Youngberg also involved the conditions at Pennhurst. Id. at 309, 310. In fact, the plain-
tiff in Youngberg also was a class member in Pennhurst and, consequently, his claim for
injunctive relief in Youngberg had been dropped. Id. at 311.
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judicial declarations, which clouded the prospect for a right to ha-
bilitation based on federal law, starkly contrasted with declara-
tions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concerning the right to
habilitation under Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act. In In re
Schmidt,29 which was decided while Pennhurst I was pending
before the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania first interpreted the MH/MR Act and, as a result,
solidified the Pennhurst plaintiffs' state law claims considerably.
In Schmidt, the state court unequivocally found a legislative man-
date requiring the State to habilitate its mentally retarded patients
in the least restrictive environment. 130 In addition, the language of
Schmidt, albeit often dicta, seemed fully consonant with the thrust
of the presumption against institutionalization delineated by the
Third Circuit:3 1
This Commonwealth has committed itself to a rejection of the
former view that indiscriminate institutionalization was the pan-
acea for the resolution of the problems presented by citizens
who were not self-sufficient because of mental retardation. We
also embrace the view that a mentally retarded person shall not
In Youngberg, the plaintiff claimed damages against state officials for sixty-three injuries
he allegedly had suffered during his stay at Pennhurst. The plaintiff also sought damages
for undue physical restraints and for failure to provide minimally adequate habilitation. Id.
at 310-11, 316, 317. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, had no difficulty finding that insti-
tutionalized mentally retarded people have a substantive due process right to enjoy safe
conditions and to be free from bodily restraint. Id. at 315-16. Justice Powell had difficulty
with the claimed right to habilitation, however, terming this issue "more troubling." Id. at
316. Despite this difficulty, Justice Powell recognized a limited right to habilitation that
applies only to retarded people who are institutionalized, id. at 317, and that extends only
to "minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue
restraint." Id. at 319. He reserved "the difficult question" of "whether a mentally retarded
person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has some general constitutional right
to training per se, even when no type or amount of training would lead to freedom." Id. at
318 (footnote omitted).
The Court's standard concerning the right to habilitation was not only limited in scope,
but also consciously deferential. To satisfy substantive due process under the standard, a
state only had to demonstrate that it made a "professional" judgment. Id. at 321-25. This
limited right, and its deferential application, provided little comfort to the plaintiffs in
Pennhurst. If the Supreme Court were going to sustain its position on constitutional
grounds in its second consideration of Pennhurst, it would have to extend its holding in
Youngberg considerably.
129. 494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981).
130. See id. at 94-98, 429 A.2d at 635-37.
131. See supra note 118.
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be determined to require involuntary residential placement un-
less the degree of retardation shows an inability to provide for
the most basic personal needs and provision for such needs is
not available and cannot be developed or provided for in the
existing home or in the community in which the individual
resides.
13 2
The allure of a state law disposition also must have been height-
ened by the prospect that such a ruling would not be reviewed by
the Supreme Court on the merits.133 Pennsylvania's interpretation
of the MH/MR Act must have seemed like a godsend, considering
the displeasure with the Third Circuit's decree that the Supreme
Court had expressed in Pennhurst L
Perhaps motivated by all of these considerations, the Third Cir-
cuit seized on Schmidt as providing a "definitive" resolution of
Pennhurst.34 In doing so, the court not only correctly read the de-
cision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,13 5 but also proceeded
appropriately through the methodology of judicial federalism. By
disposing of the case on the basis of the state law claim, the court
of appeals acted consistently with the preference announced in
Siler and in Pullman for avoiding unnecessary constitutional rul-
ings. Indeed, the Supreme Court's remand in Pennhurst I had di-
rected the court of appeals not only to reevaluate the state law
claim, but also to perform that reevaluation in light of Schmidt."6
132. 494 Pa. at 92, 429 A.2d at 633-34 (citation and footnote omitted).
133. In City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982), the Court indi-
cated that it lacked jurisdiction to review a federal circuit court decision that was based on
independent and adequate state grounds. Id. at 292. On remand in Pennhurst, the Third
Circuit concluded that the MH/MR Act provided an independent and adequate ground for
the decree. 673 F.2d at 656. The State therefore did not challenge the merits of the state law
ruling before the Supreme Court. See Brief for PARC in Opposition at 17-18, Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
134. 673 F.2d at 651-56.
135. At least one lower Pennsylvania state court has read Schmidt as recognizing the
right of a mentally retarded person "to placement in the least restrictive alternative availa-
ble." See In re Stover, 443 A.2d 327, 329 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
136. See 451 U.S. at 30-31 & n.24. Such direction on remand is not unusual for cases with
a postural resemblance to Pennhurst after its first remand. See, e.g., Estelle v. Bullard, 459
U.S. 1139 (1983); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); see also Schmidt v. Oakland Unified
School Dist., 457 U.S. 594 (1982) (federal court of appeals abused its discretion by deciding
federal constitutional claim and declining to consider pendent state claim that could have
enabled the court to avoid the constitutional question).
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Understandably, the State responded to the Third Circuit's reli-
ance on state law by fundamentally shifting its litigating position
to focusing on whether the federal court had the power to base an
injunction on state law. In arguing the case before the Third Cir-
cuit on remand, the State invoked Pullman abstention, which was
the traditional method for disabling federal jurisdiction. The court
of appeals, however, rejected it out of hand.137 This was the first
time the State raised abstention,1a8 and its timing could not have
been less appropriate. Eight years had elapsed since Halderman
had filed the complaint, the State already had argued the merits of
the state law claim before the district court and the court of ap-
peals, and, perhaps most importantly, the highest state court al-
ready had resolved the governing issue of state law definitively.13 9
The State also attempted to argue, with an equal lack of success,
that the eleventh amendment bars pendent jurisdiction over state
law claims for the prospective relief lodged against state officials. 140
The court appreciated the novelty of the argument, but it recog-
nized that the argument was incompatible with the Young-Siler
model for public law litigation against state officials.""
137. 673 F.2d at 659-60.
138. Brief for Respondent at 24, Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89 (1984).
139. On appeal, these considerations made the State's position on this issue difficult be-
cause of the Supreme Court's reluctance to mandate Pullman abstention when the request
follows substantial delay in the litigation. See Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964). But see Rudenstine, supra note 5, at 91-92 (arguing that the
Supreme Court could have invoked Pullman abstention in Pennhurst II).
140. 673 F.2d at 656-59. The State conceded the court's jurisdiction to decide the federal
claims. Id. at 656. As with Pullman abstention, the State's argument on remand represented
the first time this eleventh amendment issue received consideration. See id. at 656-59.
During the Third Circuit's first consideration of Pennhurst, the State had argued that the
district court's decree violated the eleventh amendment because it required the expenditure
of state funds. 612 F.2d at 109. The Third Circuit had rejected this argument, holding that
all of the relief ordered by the district court was prospective and that the expenditure of
funds required to comply with the decree simply was ancillary to that prospective relief. Id.;
see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 346-49 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-78
(1974); supra note 75.
141. Id. at 656-59. Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Hunter were somewhat more intrigued by
the State's revamped eleventh amendment challenge. They suggested, however, that the
court could not adopt the argument because of the clarity of contrary Supreme Court prece-
dent. Id. at 662 (Seitz, C. J., dissenting in part). The United States also believed that Siler
was "a sufficient answer" to the State's eleventh amendment argument See Brief for the
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D. A Second Trip to the Supreme Court: Pennhurst H
The State's arguments met with greater success upon a return to
the Supreme Court. In Pennhurst II, a closely divided Court re-
versed on the eleventh amendment issue, thereby abandoning the
Young-Siler-Pullman model. Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
held that the eleventh amendment prohibits federal courts from
awarding injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of
state law.142
To reach its result, the Court limited the application of Young to
claims challenging the constitutionality of state officials' actions.143
In Young, the Court noted, it had established a "fiction" to pro-
mote the supremacy of federal law. The purpose behind that fic-
tion, according to the Court in Pennhurst II, disappears when a
federal court is asked to review actions by state officials on the
basis of state law.14 4 Justice Powell viewed the assertion of pendent
jurisdiction over state law claims against state officials as funda-
mentally inconsistent with eleventh amendment values: "[I]t is dif-
ficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than
when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform
their conduct to state law. Such a result conflicts directly with the
principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amend-
ment.1 45 The Court concluded that the doctrine of pendent juris-
diction, "a judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language
United States in Opposition at 9, Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89 (1984).
142. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
143. See id. at 102-03, 104-06.
144. Id. at 104-06. In buttressing his limitation of Young, Justice Powell hammered at the
illegitimacy of the Young doctrine. He noted its "irony" when juxtaposed against the state
action requirement of the fourteenth amendment, id. at 105, and he denigrated the doctrine
as "a fiction that has been narrowly construed," id. at 114 n.25. The Court stopped short of
overruling Young, however, contenting itself to "do no more than question the vitality of the
ultra vires doctrine in the Eleventh Amendment context." Id. At least one commentator has
speculated that the Court is not likely to overrule Young, notwithstanding the Court's skep-
ticism about the doctrine it provides. See Rudenstine, supra note 5, at 99.
145. 465 U.S. at 106. Professor Brown has questioned Justice Powell's concern that a fed-
eral court's injunction grounded on state law significantly intrudes on state autonomy. See
Brown, supra note 5, at 360; see also Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary
and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 759, 780 (1972) ("[T]he idea that it is undesir-
able for federal courts to decide issues involving questions of state law is based on an over-
simplified approach to federalism.").
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of Art[icle] III," should not displace "the explicit limitation on
federal jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment.""14
With this statement, the Court effectively overruled Siler, at least
as it applied to suits brought against state officials. 147
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the four dissenting jus-
tices decried the Court's conclusion.148 In language indicative of his
harsh dissent, Justice Stevens rejected the result as "perverse."
Justice Stevens stated: "[T]he Court concludes that Pennsylvania's
sovereign immunity prevents a federal court from enjoining the
conduct that Pennsylvania itself has prohibited. No rational view
of the sovereign immunity of the States supports this result.' 1 49
The dissenting justices would have applied the same eleventh
amendment standard to the state claim and to the federal claim.
Whether a claim for an injunction is based on state law or federal
law, according to the justices, "conduct that exceeds the scope of
an official's lawful discretion is not conduct the sovereign has au-
thorized and hence is subject to injunction.' 50 In other words, the
146. 465 U. S. at 117-18. Of course, the eleventh amendment did not apply "explicitly" to
this case, because Pennhurst was a suit brought by citizens of Pennsylvania. See supra note
42 and accompanying text. The Court's application of the eleventh amendment relied on the
"judge-made doctrine" of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). See supra notes 39-48 and
accompanying text. In dissent, Justice Stevens reminded Justice Powell of the importance
of Hans to his argument. See 465 U.S. at 140 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Justice Powell attempted to defuse "Siler and subsequent cases" by arguing that the
Court in those cases did not "mention the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the
state-law claim." Id. at 118; see 465 U.S. at 119 n.28 ("Nothing in our decision is meant to
cast doubt on the desirability of applying the Siler principle in cases where the federal court
has jurisdiction to decide the state-law issues."). Justice Peckham, however, wrote the opin-
ion in Siler just one year after he wrote the opinion in Young. Viewed in this light, Justice
Peckham's failure to discuss the eleventh amendment in Siler most likely reflected his belief
that it was inapplicable because of the precedent in Young. See Brief for the United States
in Opposition, supra note 141, at 9-10.
148. By Justice Stevens' count, "at least 28 cases, spanning well over a century of this
Court's jurisprudence," were "repudiated" by the Court's construction of the eleventh
amendment as barring jurisdiction over pendent state claims against state officials litigating
in federal court. 465 U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 159-63.
149. Id. at 126. "In such a case," Justice Stevens argued, "the sovereign's interest lies
with those who seek to enforce its laws, rather than those who have violated them." Id. at
150. In his commentary on Pennhurst II, Professor Shapiro observed that no sovereign im-
munity available under state law could have applied to the case. See Shapiro, supra note 5,
at 78.
150. 465 U.S. at 139. "Whether that conduct also gives rise to damage liability," Justice
Stevens added, "is an entirely separate question." Id.; see id. at 146 n.29.
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dissenters were willing to apply the Young doctrine to the state
law claim, but the majority was not.151
The Court remanded Pennhurst yet again to the Third Circuit.
This time, it instructed the court of appeals to consider the re-
maining federal statutory and constitutional claims. 152 The parties
had had enough though, and they settled the litigation once the
State agreed to make good on its original intention to close Penn-
hurst, albeit several years later than planned. 15 3 In the wake of the
State's decision to settle, however, lay not only the waste of eleven
years of litigation, but also a transmutation of Pullman abstention
and an altered concept of judicial federalism.
IV. Pullman ABSTENTION AFTER Pennhurst
Reduced to their essentials, Pullman and Pennhurst share an
identical factual configuration. In both suits, private parties sought
injunctions against state officials to prevent alleged constitutional
violations. In addition, the challengers in both cases argued alter-
natively that the officials' actions were contrary to the relevant
state enabling statute. Given the similarity between the two cases,
the Supreme Court's failure in Pennhurst to consider Pullman ab-
stention seriously is curious.'" Even more remarkable is that the
Court, without explanation, swept aside the traditional role of
Pullman abstention as a flexible regulator of judicial federalism
151. Id. at 144-50, 158-59. The doctrinal basis for the disagreement between the majority
and the dissent was Justice Stevens' view that Justice Powell incorrectly portrayed Young
as based on the "unprincipled accommodation between federal and state interests." Justice
Stevens asserted instead that the stripping principle of Young, see supra note 63 and ac-
companying text, had "deep roots in the history of sovereign immunity." Id. at 146. Accord-
ing to Justice Stevens, the key question was not whether the state officials had acted uncon-
stitutionally, but rather whether they had acted illegally. Id. at 147-49; see id. at 150, 157-
58.
152. Id. at 125.
153. Under the settlement, "[t]he state is to close the institution by July 1, 1986, move its
435 patients to other community facilities and spend about $43 million to provide care for
the mentally retarded." N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1985, at 6, col. 5; see also supra note 101 (not-
ing the original plan to close Pennhurst by 1980).
154. The state officials abandoned their Pullman abstention contention during argument
before the Supreme Court in Pennhurst II. See 465 U.S. at 97. Justice Powell made passing
reference to abstention in his opinion, id. at 122 & n.32, but he did not consider the applica-
tion of Pullman abstention to Pennhurst or the effect his eleventh amendment ruling would
have on the Pullman doctrine.
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concerns in public law challenges to state action, and replaced it
with a fixed jurisdictional bar to consideration of the state law
claim in those suits.
The significance of the change that the Court silently effected in
Pennhurst is seen best by outlining the method district judges
should use to handle lawsuits fitting the factual configuration of
Pullman and Pennhurst.155 Under Pullman abstention, district
judges protect judicial federalism values essentially by focusing on
the nature of the state law claim and on the sufficiency of state
processes to resolve the claim expeditiously. More specifically, the
judges assess their ability to predict what the outcome of the state
claim would be if it were presented to the highest state court.'56 In
making this determination, the judges concentrate mainly on the
certainty of state law governing the claim.15 7 While no judge could
predict another court's resolution of a particular claim with abso-
lute certainty, 88 district judges usually have enough schooling in
local law to determine whether they can make such a prediction
with confidence. 59 Only when the judge lacks this confidence or, in
Justice Frankfurter's words, when the state law is "far from clear,"
is abstention an appropriate option.6 0 Pullman abstention thus
envisions a flexible, case-by-case analysis.'6 '
155. When exploring the concept of judicial federalism, as Professor Tribe has observed,
"the Court's chief doctrinal concern has focused on the federal district courts." L. TRIBE,
supra note 2, § 3-39, at 149.
156. See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 499-500; Field, supra note 12, at 1090.
157. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 304; Field, supra note 82, at 602.
158. See Field, supra note 93, at 697.
159. See Field, supra note 12, at 1090. This schooling comes from several sources. Per.
haps the most important source is the judges' knowledge of state law acquired from their
years of legal practice within a particular state. This schooling also derives from district
judges' frequent application of state law, primarily when resolving suits within the court's
diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938), or pendent jurisdiction, see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
See M. RmisH, supra note 19, at 234.
160. See Pulman, 312 U.S. at 499. Professor Field has observed that "as state law be-
comes increasingly clear in whatever direction, abstaining becomes increasingly purpose-
less." Field, supra note 12, at 1105; see 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note
12, at 455-58.
161. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 373 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Field, supra note 12, at 1101; see
also H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL Vmw 94 (1973) (although author origi-
nally favored codification of abstention, he now favors case-by-case analysis).
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Under Pennhurst II, on the other hand, this particularized, dis-
cretionary balancing of federalism values has no place. Instead,
district judges must dismiss the state law claims in all cases. In
effect, the Supreme Court overruled Pullman as it applies to the
type of litigation for which it was designed-pendent state claims
against state officials in federal cases that present alternative fed-
eral constitutional claims. Under Pennhurst I, district judges
never consider whether the governing state law is clear or whether
they can predict the ultimate resolution by the highest state court
with confidence. The judges do not even consider whether the state
itself offers an effective means of resolving the state law claim.
Under Pennhurst II, the district court never has jurisdiction to
hear the state law claim.
The Pullman doctrine nevertheless retains some signs of life af-
ter Pennhurst II. Ironically, however, it retains its clearest vitality
in cases involving two potential factual configurations that differ
from the factual configuration in Pullman. The first of these fac-
tual configurations involves a suit for prospective relief against
state or local officials for a violation of the federal Constitution,
when resolution of that federal question is entwined with a ques-
tion of state law. For example, a federal constitutional challenge to
a state statute that contains ambiguous operative provisions would
fall into this category.1 6 2 Although the interpretation of the chal-
lenged state statute in such a case would not be relevant to the
separate state law claim, as it was in Pennhurst, the district judge
still would have to interpret the state statute before resolving the
federal constitutional claim. The Supreme Court has applied the
Pullman analysis in cases of this type since Pennhurst.63
The second factual configuration in which Pullman retains a pri-
mary role involves a case in which the district court has exercised
162. Professor Field has termed this type of lawsuit a "construction case." Field, supra
note 12, at 1111. For an in depth discussion of Pullman abstention as it applies to this type
of lawsuit, see id. at 1111-21.
163. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984) (Pullman abstention not
appropriate because state law was clear); see also Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 105 S.
Ct. 2794, 2804 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Although federal courts generally have a
duty to adjudicate federal questions properly before them, this Court has long recognized
that concerns for comity and federalism may require federal courts to abstain from deciding
federal constitutional issues that are entwined with the interpretation of state law.").
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federal question jurisdiction over a constitutional claim and pen-
dent jurisdiction over a state law claim, but in which the defend-
ants are not state officials and thus are not protected by the elev-
enth amendment. Clearly, the Pullman doctrine still applies when
the defendants are private parties. Situations involving private
parties as defendants, however, are unusual because of the state
action requirement for most constitutional claims. 6 4
More commonly, cases of this type involve defendants who are
local officials or officials of other governmental subdivisions of a
state. Pullman abstention arguably applies to these cases as well,
but its application has been clouded by Pennhurst II because some
of the defendants in that case were county, as opposed to state,
officials. The plaintiffs argued in Pennhurst II that the Third Cir-
cuit could affirm the decree on state law grounds because the elev-
enth amendment does not bar claims against local government offi-
cials.' 5  The Supreme Court understandably rejected this
argument, noting quite correctly that the decree operated primar-
ily against the state officials who were charged with operating
Pennhurst, which, after all, was a state institution. 66
Justice Powell, however, was not content to rest matters there;
he added that the eleventh amendment might bar the state law
claim against the county officials in any event. 6 7 Although Justice
Powell noted the common understanding that "the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply to 'counties and similar municipal cor-
porations,' "168 he indicated that immunity nevertheless might
164. See 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MIu.LER & E. COOPER, supra note 12, at 453.
165. See Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 123; see also 673 F.2d at 656 (finding this argument
persuasive).
166. 465 U.S. at 123-24. The Court resorted to its discretion under United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), to dismiss the state law claim against the County. Id. at 921;
see supra note 75 (discussing Gibbs). The Court's resolution of this issue was consistent
with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in Schmidt that, under the MH/MR Act,
the State has primary authority for ensuring the provision of appropriate services to its
mentally retarded citizens. See In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 94-95, 429 A.2d 631, 635 (1981).
167. 465 U.S. at 124 n.34.
168. Id. at 123 n.24 (quoting Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280
(1977)). Justice Powell also cited Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890), to support
this proposition. 465 U.S. at 123 n.24. The exclusion of counties and municipalities from
eleventh amendment immunity, as explained by the Court in Luning, stems from the text of
the amendment: "The Eleventh Amendment limits the jurisdiction [of federal courts] only
as to suits against a state." Luning, 133 U.S. at 530. Cities and counties do not share the
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attach in a case such as Pennhurst because, "[g]iven that the ac-
tions of the county commissioners and mental-health administra-
tors are dependent on funding from the State, it may be that relief
granted against these county officials, when exercising their func-
tions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State." '
The Court in Pennhurst H might well have signaled an intention
to revisit the applicability of eleventh amendment immunity to lo-
cal officials. 170 In light of the Court's heightened regard for state
autonomy, and its apparent ambivalence toward pendent jurisdic-
tion, this type of suit might provide the next extension of eleventh
amendment immunity and a corresponding abandonment of the
Pullman doctrine.
The most intriguing speculation concerning the viability of Pull-
man abstention after Pennhurst, however, does not concern the
doctrine's primary, and intended, role of determining which state
law issues remain within the cognizance of federal courts. Instead,
this speculation centers on what can be called the secondary appli-
cation of Pullman, that is, the use of the doctrine to avoid or to
delay adjudication of constitutional issues in federal courts. Con-
sideration of the effect on district court litigation against state offi-
cials helps explain the effect of Pennhurst H on Pullman in this
regard.
A plaintiff who wishes to initiate litigation within the Pullman-
Pennhurst configuration has several optionq One option is to
abandon the state law claim and simply to file the federal constitu-
tional claim in federal district court. Although Pennhurst II poses
no eleventh amendment barrier to the adjudication of such a
claim, a litigant justifiably may hesitate to forego a promising state
law claim simply to secure a federal forum.
A second option is to join the state and federal claims in a state
court proceeding. This course carries the benefit of preserving the
state law claim, but it may jeopardize an appropriate disposition of
the constitutional claim because the plaintiff has opted out of the
states' immunity, according to the Court in Luning, because they are separate entities. Id.
("[W]hile the county is territorially a part of the state, yet politically it is also a corporation
created by and with such powers as are given to it by the state.").
169. 465 U.S. at 124 n.34.
170. Professor Shapiro has noted this prospect with some disappointment. See Shapiro,
supra note 5, at 81-82.
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federal forum.171 Even if this option presented no tactical disad-
vantage in many cases, a system that forced too many of these liti-
gants into state court would frustrate the animating premise of the
Young doctrine, highlighted by Justice Powell, that lower federal
courts should be available to citizens asserting federal rights
against state officials. 72 After Pennhurst II, however, the tactical
incentive for litigants to file federal claims in state courts is real.
As a result, the Pennhurst decision has operated insidiously to un-
dermine a result that the Court purported to reaffirm by limiting
the Young doctrine to federal claims.17 3
Neither of the options set out above includes a role for Pullman
abstention. At the same time, for the reasons mentioned, neither
option is wholly satisfying. Faced with that dilemma, a litigant
may choose the third option available after Pennhurst II: filing the
state law claim in state court and the federal claim in federal
court.17 " If the litigant can afford to split the claims and to carry
two concurrent cases, this course avoids the tactical costs associ-
ated with opting to let either the state or federal judicial system
resolve a controversy with state officials.
Even if the plaintiff is willing to pursue simultaneous litigation,
however, the state may not be, and it may move to stay the federal
litigation pending the outcome of the state claim. In this situation,
the district judge arguably should invoke Pullman abstention, -re-
sulting in what is referred to here as the secondary application of
the doctrine. Invocation of Pullman abstention in this situation
would fulfill a purpose animating the doctrine: avoidance of unnec-
essary and premature constitutional decisions. 1' 5 Because this
171. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HAv. L. REv. 1105 (1977). For a rejoinder to
Professor Neuborne's thesis that federal courts are more competent than state courts in
adjudicating federal questions, see Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Lit-
igation, 22 Wm & MARY L. REv. 605, 629-35 (1981).
172. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 89.
173. This criticism of Pennhurst II has been labeled the "forum-access critique." Brown,
supra note 5, at 356; see Rudenstine, supra note 5, at 83. Although Justice Powell acknowl-
edged that the Court's holding could have this effect, he felt that the prospect was "not
uncommon" and that, in any event, his interpretation was compelled by the eleventh
amendment. See 465 U.S. at 122.
174. Justice Powell identified this option in Pennhurst I. See 465 U.S. at 121.
175. See M. REniSH, supra note 19, at 234; Field, supra note 12, at 1096-1101; see also
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis J., concurring) (containing the
490 [Vol. 27:449
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purpose is not the only justification for the doctrine, however, the
Court has observed that "the opportunity to avoid decision of a
constitutional question does not alone justify abstention by a fed-
eral court."'17 6
The other purpose of Pullman abstention, respecting state au-
tonomy and expertise by allowing state courts to resolve uncertain
questions of state law, actually is the primary justification for the
doctrine. 17 This justification is implicated to some degree in a si-
multaneous litigation situation because a federal decision on the
constitutional claim might moot the controversy underlying the
state lawsuit. In that event, state interests might be impaired be-
cause the state judiciary would lose its opportunity to define the
scope of the state officials' authority under state law. This poten-
tial impairment of state interests, juxtaposed with the federal judi-
ciary's desire to avoid unnecessary and premature decision of con-
stitutional questions, may indicate to the district judge that the
most prudent course would be to await the outcome of the state
litigation. The state court may have a more weighty, immediate
interest in resolving the controversy than the federal court.
This reasoning is more alluring than convincing, however, be-
cause it does not reflect the precise federalism concern articulated
in Pullman. Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Pullman fo-
cused on the problems attendant to a federal judge's prediction of
a state judiciary's resolution of an unclear state law issue.178 When
a plaintiff splits claims between state and federal courts in re-
sponse to Pennhurst, these difficulties in prediction cannot arise,
because the federal court never has the opportunity to act as an
expositor of state law. Consequently, by asserting Pullman absten-
tion, the state would be asking the federal court to forego its role
as expositor of federal law.
When the state asserts Pullman abstention in this split claim
situation, the posture of the federal litigation resembles cases in
which federal courts consider whether to stay or to dismiss the
Court's classic statement that is should avoid adjudication on constitutional grounds if it
has an alternate basis of decision).
176. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 815 n.21
(1976).
177. Bezanson, supra note 83, at 1144; Field, supra note 12, at 1084.
178. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 499-500.
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litigation before them in deference to parallel state proceedings.
After wavering in recent years, the Supreme Court in Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.179 re-
cently reaffirmed its stance in Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. United States s0 against stays or dismissals in such situ-
ations, absent "exceptional circumstances."' 81 The Court has es-
chewed a "hard-and-fast rule" against such stays and dismissals, 8 2
however, preferring instead a balancing methodology:
[T]he decision whether to dismiss a federal action because of
parallel state-court litigation does not rest on a mechanical
checklist, but on a careful balancing of the important factors as
they apply in a given case, with the balance heavily weighted in
favor of the exercise of jurisdiction. The weight to be given to
any one factor may vary greatly from case to case, depending on
the particular setting of the case." 3
Under this "parallel litigation" line of precedent, a district judge,
absent an unusual situation, 84 would have to determine whether
the split of state and federal claims triggered by Pennhurst II jus-
tifies a stay of the federal case.
179. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
180. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
181. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 19. The Court had articulated this stance in Colo-
rado River, see 424 U.S. at 817-18, but Justice Rehnquist had questioned the principle in
Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978) (plurality opinion). In Will, Justice Rehn-
quist had suggested that federal district judges enjoy a broad and largely unreviewable dis-
cretion to stay proceedings because of pending state litigation. 437 U.S. at 665. In Moses H.
Cone, however, the Court repudiated Justice Rehnquist's suggestion and reaffirmed its gen-
eral stance against such stays. See 460 U.S. at 16-19; Redish, supra note 88, at 97.
182. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 15.
183. Id. at 16; see Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818-19. To illustrate the factors a district
judge should consider in reaching a decision, the Court in Moses H. Cone described the
criteria it originally had delineated in Colorado River- (1) an act of Congress prescribing a
"clear federal policy" of avoiding piecemeal adjudication ("[b]y far the most important fac-
tor," according to the Court); (2) the lack of "substantial progress" in the federal litigation;
(3) the presence in the federal lawsuit of "extensive rights governed by state law"; (4) the
inconvenient location of the federal courthouse; and (5) the federal government's willingness
to litigate similar suits in the state system. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 16; see Colorado
River, 424 U.S. at 819-20.
184. One unusual situation that might justify a stay involves a case in which state litiga-
tion began long before the federal case. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818. If the federal
suit were vexatious in nature, it also might justify a stay. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 18
n.20.
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This split claim situation might be sufficient to overcome the
presumption that a federal court must exercise the jurisdiction
Congress has dictated. In the first place, the policies underlying
the presumption against the stay assume that "considerations of
proper constitutional adjudication and regard for federal-state re-
lations" do not apply.8 5 Instead, these policies rest solely on con-
siderations of efficient judicial administration and case manage-
ment. 8 6 Although these policies apply to bifurcated litigation
along the lines that the Court suggested in Pennhurst II, more is
at work. The policies underlying Pullman abstention, which are
not present in the usual parallel litigation setting, also are impli-
cated. The subtle problem now facing the federal courts is whether
the distinctly different policies present in bifurcated litigation
under the Pennhurst II model warrant a secondary application of
Pullman abstention, and whether these policies constitute the "ex-
ceptional circumstances" that the Court referred to in Colorado
River and Moses H. Cone.
Understandably, federal judges have had insufficient time to as-
similate the effect of Pennhurst II on their usual approach to Pull-
man abstention. The decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit in Rogers v. Okin'8 7 illustrates the
confusion of federal courts concerning their role in constitutional
litigation against state officials after Pennhurst II. The Rogers liti-
gation closely resembled Pennhurst. Involuntarily institutionalized
mental patients sued state officials in federal district court, assert-
ing a right to refuse antipsychotic drugs. 8' The patients, who re-
sided at Boston State Hospital, won an injunction against the offi-
cials in district court based on both federal constitutional and state
law grounds. 8 9 In its first consideration of Rogers, the First Circuit
185. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.
186. Id.
187. 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
188. Id. at 2.
189. Id.; see Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), a/I'd, 634 F.2d 650 (1st
Cir. 1980), vacated sub noma. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). The patients also won an
injunction against the State's forcible seclusion of patients during nonemergencies. 478 F.
Supp. at 1371-75. The district court rejected the patients' claims for damages. Id. at 1375-
89.
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affirmed the district court's decision, at least in part.'90 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to determine whether involuntarily
committed mental patients had a constitutional right to refuse
treatment with antipsychotic drugs.19' While the case was pending,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided that, absent
an emergency, only a judge could require a noninstitutionalized
mentally incompetent person to receive medication forcibly. Ac-
cording to the Massachusetts court, no other state official or doctor
could authorize such forced treatment. 192 The Massachusetts deci-
sion, which was based both on Massachusetts common law and on
the United States Constitution, 93 prompted the Supreme Court to
remand Rogers to the First Circuit, with instructions to determine
whether it could resolve the controversy based on state law
alone.194 On remand, the First Circuit certified nine questions of
state law to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.'95 In
response, the state court delineated procedural and substantive
rights of institutionalized mental patients under state law that, in
the opinion of the First Circuit, exceeded the rights guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 96 Before the First
Circuit could act on the basis of that response, however, the Su-
preme Court decided Pennhurst II.
The First Circuit recognized that the Court's decision in Penn-
hurst II had deprived it of power to issue any relief based on the
rights identified by the state courts. It also noted, however, that
Justice Powell's eleventh amendment ruling had not deprived it of
190. See Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers,
457 U.S. 291 (1982).
191. See Okin v. Rogers, 451 U.S. 906 (1981), granting cert. to 634 F.2d 650 (lst Cir.
1980).
192. See In re Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 433-43, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51-56 (1981).
193. See id. at 417 & n.1, 433 n.9, 421 N.E.2d at 42 & n.1, 51 n.9.
194. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 306 (1982). The Court found a distinct possibility
"that Massachusetts recognizes liberty interests of persons adjudged incompetent that are
broader than those protected directly by the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 303.
The Court also invoked its "settled policy to avoid unnecessary decisions of constitutional
issues." Id. at 305.
195. See 738 F.2d at 3.
196. Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308
(1983); see 738 F.2d at 3.
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jurisdiction over the federal constitutional claim.119 In light of the
state court's responses to the certified questions, however, the hos-
pital officials argued that the court of appeals should abstain from
deciding the federal claim because the state court's responses had
provided sufficient state law grounds to dispose of the case and, in
effect, had mooted the constitutional claim.198
Applying conventional principles of Pullman abstention, the
First Circuit summarily rejected the hospital officials' argument.
The court held that Pullman abstention was inappropriate because
the "certification process [had] amply accommodated state inter-
ests and [had] yielded an unambiguous elucidation of relevant
state law."199 Because the rights had been delineated only in the
form of an advisory opinion and not an enforceable judgment, the
court rejected the officials' mootness argument and proceeded to
resolve the federal claims.2 00
The court's decision to proceed with adjudication of the federal
claim in Rogers vividly illustrates the confusion that has followed
Pennhurst IL The First Circuit relied on the state court's re-
sponses to the certified questions to determine rights established
by state law that trigger procedural due process protection.2 01 The
First Circuit also concluded that Massachusetts law provided
mental patients with greater procedural protections than were re-
quired by the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 02 Al-
though the way the State ran Boston State Hospital fell short of
both state law and federal substantive due process requirements,
the court concluded rather easily that the state procedural rights
newly articulated by the Massachusetts high court satisfied federal
197. 738 F.2d at 3. The First Circuit recognized the "irony" that the Supreme Court in
Pennhurst II had deprived the First Circuit of the power to carry out the Supreme Court's
own mandate in Mills. Id. at 4.
198. Id. at 4.
199. Id. at 5.
200. Id. at 4. The state court opinion was a response to questions certified by the First
Circuit, not to a judgment rendered by a lower state court. See id. The court of appeals also
was troubled by the state officials' refusal to enter into a binding agreement to abide by the
state court's opinion. Id. at 5.
201. Id. at 6-7. The court had recognized at the outset that the due process clause pro-
vides procedural protection for liberty interests created by state law. Id. at 5.
202. Id. at 8. Indeed, the court of appeals held that "the Massachusetts procedures rise
well above the minima required by any arguable due process standard." Id.
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procedural due process requirements. 0 Because the mental pa-
tients' rights under state law exceeded the procedural protections
given to those rights under fourteenth amendment due process,
however, the court found itself in a curious position when it sought
to frame an appropriate remedy. An injunction requiring hospital
officials only to follow the procedures mandated by fourteenth
amendment due process would have made little sense in light of
the more stringent state law requirements delineated in the Massa-
chusetts advisory opinion. An injunction requiring hospital officials
to comply with the more stringent state requirements, on the other
hand, would have run afoul of Pennhurst 11.204 As a result of this
dilemma, the patients in Rogers won the lawsuit but received no
relief.20 5 Given this result, the court of appeals achieved little by
formally refusing to abstain from deciding the federal claim, be-
cause clearly it did so in effect.20
The blind alley down which the First Circuit traveled in Rogers
should serve as a warning to federal courts following Pennhurst I.
Although the express terms of Justice Powell's opinion do not af-
fect the federal courts' obligation to apply federal law, such an ef-
fect nonetheless is likely because of the subtle interweaving of
state and federal claims in modern public law litigation involving
state officials. To understand this phenomenon, one must recall
that Pennhurst I, in essence, forbids federal district courts from
exercising pendent jurisdiction over any state law claim against
state officials. One also must recall the functional necessity of the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine. Without the power to decide pen-
dent state law claims, Professor Wright has argued, "a court of
203. Id. at 9.
204. See id.
205. The court of appeals directed the district court, on remand, to issue a declaratory
judgment that the state law rights identified on certification to the Massachusetts court
create liberty interests protected by the due process clause. Id. at 9. At the same time,
however, the court of appeals ordered the district court to terminate its injunction forbid-
ding forced medication. According to the court of appeals, this did not mean that the plain-
tiffs received nothing, because the litigation had triggered the Massachusetts high court's
advisory opinion delineating protections against forcible medication afforded by state law.
Id.
206. In truth, the court had gone beyond Pullman abstention, because it had dismissed
the federal lawsuit rather than staying it. See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501-02.
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original jurisdiction could not function. 2107 The dilemma faced at
the remedy stage of Rogers reflects the void left by Pennhurst II.
When a litigant wishes to assert federal and state claims against
state officials, a common occurrence in the world of public law liti-
gation, federal courts are unable to resolve the controversy fully. In
short, they cannot function as courts. If a state court can hear both
federal and state claims fully in one integrated case, but federal
courts cannot, prudent litigants will abandon the federal courts in
favor of state courts.
More intriguing, and unsettling, than these tactical implications
is that Pennhurst II also will encourage federal judges to abandon
adjudication of federal claims against state officials. The recent de-
cision of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York in Canady v. Koch2 8 hints at the drive toward this
secondary application of Pullman. In Canady, several homeless
mothers sued state and city officials, claiming that the officials had
denied them emergency shelter in violation of state and federal
law.209 The plaintiffs previously had filed an action in state court
based on state law grounds, seeking comparable, but broader, relief
than they requested in the federal case. The state trial court had
denied a preliminary injunction, and that denial was on appeal
when the plaintiffs filed the federal complaint.2 10 The federal court
decided to stay the federal proceedings pending resolution of the
parallel state proceeding. 211
The court's holding that abstention was appropriate because of
the pendency of the state action21 2 is particularly interesting. The
district court saw value in avoiding the "piecemeal litigation" that
would take place if it immediately decided the federal issue. After
Pennhurst II, the court noted, it was unable to litigate the state
law claims against the state defendants.213 The state court, by con-
trast, was well-situated to "provide a comprehensive decision on
207. C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 103; see Brown, supra note 5, at 357.
208. 608 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 768 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1985).
209. Id. at 1462-63.
210. Id. at 1463-65.
211. Id. at 1466, 1475.
212. Id. at 1473-75.
213. Id. at 1473-74.
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the rights of homeless families. 2 14 Given these circumstances, the
court invoked Colorado River and Moses H. Cone "to defer to the
state court.
'215
Canady was not a pristine test of the role of abstention after
Pennhurst. Several factors in Canady pointed toward abstention
in any event.210 Nonetheless, the plaintiffs' bifurcation of state and
federal claims in the manner suggested by Pennhurst II-or, as
the court put it, the "piecemeal litigation"-certainly played a role
in Canady, and these considerations no doubt will continue to be a
focus of concern for federal courts in similar settings. The district
court's reliance in Canady on the importance of avoiding "piece-
meal litigation," though initially plausible, is not convincing.
The court in Canady misread Colorado River and Moses H.
Cone when it held that the avoidance of piecemeal litigation is of
paramount concern.21 7 Piecemeal litigation always results when a
federal court denies a stay in a case involving parallel state litiga-
tion. If the district court in Canady was correct, the federal court
in a bifurcated litigation situation generally would grant a stay or
dismiss the action. The holdings in Colorado River and Moses H.
Cone that a stay is justified only in "exceptional circumstances" 1 8
make clear, however, that the court in Canady was incorrect. In
Colorado River, for example, the avoidance of piecemeal litigation
was important to the Court because Congress had passed legisla-
tion that articulated "a clear federal policy" of avoiding "piecemeal
adjudication of water rights in a river system."2'1 9 In Moses H.
Cone, on the other hand, the need to avoid piecemeal litigation
had "no force" because "the relevant federal law require[d] piece-
meal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration
agreement. '220  According to these two decisions, then, the
214. Id. at 1474. According to the district court, the federal litigation raised "only a single
aspect of a complex problem." Id. The court also believed that "the primary battleground
[of the controversy was] state law, and unsettled state law at that." Id.
215. Id. at 1475. The court also favored a stay because of the substantial progress of the
state litigation and the failure of the federal case to progress on any substantive issue. Id. at
1473.
216. See id. at 1468-75.
217. Id. at 1473-74.
218. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
219. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819.
220. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 19, 20 (emphasis deleted).
[Vol. 27:449
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
governing federal law dictates the weight, if any, that a district
court should accord to the policy of avoiding piecemeal litigation.
The bifurcated litigation situation created by Pennhurst II cor-
responds more closely to Moses H. Cone than to Colorado River.
Justice Powell foresaw the bifurcation of claims as a predictable
result of his opinion in Pennhurst II. He believed, however, that
the relevant federal law-the eleventh amendment-mandated his
holding.221 Moreover, he downplayed bifurcation as "not uncom-
mon" when private parties litigate against state officials.222 This re-
laxed view of the piecemeal litigation caused by Pennhurst II is
difficult to square with the demands of the "exceptional circum-
stances" test in Colorado River and Moses H. Cone.
Although the district court's approach in Canady is troublesome
in its application of conventional doctrine, it is nonetheless under-
standable because the formalism of Pennhurst II has caused an
essential dysfunction in the jurisdictional model for public law liti-
gation. Predictably, federal district judges now feel enormous pres-
sure to escape the awkwardness of Justice Powell's replacement
model. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has observed that when
state courts become "the sole forum for effective relief of state law
claims" in litigation involving federal and state claims, "very per-
suasive grounds for abstention" are provided.223 Such holdings
demonstrate how Pennhurst II, which purported to leave Young
intact with respect to federal claims against state officials, can viti-
ate the "fiction" that so troubled Justice Powell. These holdings
also demonstrate how significantly the Court has altered the con-
cept of judicial federalism.
221. See Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 121-23.
222. Id. at 122.
223. Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 737 F.2d 830, 837 n.18 (9th Cir. 1984), cert, denied,
105 S. Ct. 1179 (1985) (noting the effect of Pennhurst II in land use cases); accord Allendale
Leasing, Inc. v. Stone, 614 F. Supp. 1440, 1452 (D.R.I. 1985) (when Pennhurst is applied to
dismiss a pendent state claim, Pullman abstention of the related federal constitutional
claim "appears mandatory"). Commentators also have noted the possibility that a federal
judge may abstain from adjudicating a federal claim that has been split from a state claim
being litigated in state court. See Smith, supra note 5, at 272-75; Note, The Eleventh
Amendment's Lengthening Shadow Over Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 34 DEPAuL L. REv. 515, 549-50 (1985).
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V. JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AFTER Pennhurst
Throughout its development, the concept of judicial federalism
has been characterized by both flexibility and flux. Justice Frank-
furter, long before joining the Court, captured this essence when
he observed: "The only enduring tradition represented by the volu-
minous body of congressional enactments governing the federal ju-
diciary is the tradition of questioning and compromise, of contem-
porary adequacy and timely fitness. '224 His insight describes as
well the development of judge-made doctrines that govern public
law litigation against state officials, including not only pendent ju-
risdiction and Pullman abstention, but also principles such as
state immunity from suit.2 25 In crafting the concept of judicial fed-
eralism, the Court has remained focused on two sets of values wor-
thy of respect: meaningful state autonomy, and state governance in
conformity with the Constitution. Because these values often pull
in different directions, judicial federalism necessarily retains a cer-
tain ambivalence. Because both values are legitimate, however, the
Court has sought to accommodate them rather than to choose be-
tween them.226
The Supreme Court has been unwilling, or perhaps unable, to
sustain fixed jurisdictional rules that tilt the balance too heavily
toward either of the competing interests. In truth, judicial federal-
ism is less a theoretical concept than a device for allocating the
224. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 514-15 (1928). In this article, preceding the observation quoted
in the text, Justice Frankfurter offered the following explanation for the pattern of jurisdic-
tional statutes he had surveyed:
Not inherent reasons, then, but practical justifications explain the past judici-
ary acts and must vindicate existing jurisdiction. The force and dangers of pa-
rochial attachments, the effectiveness and limitations of a centralized judiciary
administering law over a continent, the dependability of state courts, the con-
venience of suitors, shifting economic and political sentiments,-such influ-
ences, with varying incidence, have shaped the accommodations of authority
distributed between the national judiciary and the state courts. The present
jurisdiction cannot rely on tradition. Always have the accommodations been
temporary.
Id. at 514.
225. Although the states' immunity from suit is grounded in the eleventh amendment, the
doctrines that guide application of the amendment only can be considered "judge made."
See Brown, supra note 5, at 359; supra notes 39-66 and accompanying text.
226. See Weinberg, supra note 6, at 1205.
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nation's judicial business between state and federal courts. As Jus-
tice Frankfurter recognized, such a system cannot be animated by
ideology; it must seek "practical justifications ' 227 that allow each
forum to serve its role in the federal system. Viewed this way, the
Court's flexible, moderate stance in Pullman was proper, because
it sought to guide, rather than to foreclose, the discretion of federal
district judges to make case-specific assessments of the interplay of
federalism interests before them. Though the course had wavered
during the years before Pennhurst II, Pullman abstention had ce-
mented that approach to, judicial federalism. 228
Perhaps the most far-reaching effect of Pennhurst II has been
the abandonment of that moderating approach. As one commenta-
tor has noted, the jurisdictional bar of the eleventh amendment is
too blunt an instrument to accommodate the "delicate" federalism
concerns that were present in Pennhurst.229 This criticism may
seem odd given the frequent reference in Pennhurst II to federal-
ism values and to the appropriate roles of state and federal courts
in reviewing state officials' actions, but Justice Powell's discussion
was so abstract, and his assessment of state autonomy so reveren-
tial, that he failed to account for the differing balances of state and
federal interests that occur in each case. A federal court mandate
to state officials based on state law is not always a serious intrusion
on state autonomy. On the contrary, the implications for state poli-
cymaking can range widely depending on the circumstances. 230
Pullman abstention accounted for those differences, but the juris-
dictional bar imposed in Pennhurst II does not.
The First Circuit's opinion in Rogers again is illustrative. As
mentioned above, the factual configuration in Rogers mirrored
Pullman and Pennhurst because it involved a federal claim and a
pendent state claim lodged by private parties against state officials
in federal court. Because the law governing the state claim in Rog-
ers was unclear, the federal court certified several questions to the
highest state court. The state court responded with a definitive
ruling that, in effect, resolved the state claim in the plaintiffs'
227. See supra note 224.
228. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
229. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 79.
230. See Brown, supra note 5, at 360.
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favor. After the state court's ruling, all that remained for proper
resolution of the controversy was the entry of an injunction requir-
ing the state officials to follow the rules laid down by the state
court. The state court surely would not have hesitated to enter
such an injunction if the questions had been presented to it in the
context of a case within its jurisdiction. After Pennhurst II, how-
ever, the First Circuit was unable to afford any meaningful relief,
even though the cost to state autonomy caused by entry of an in-
junction to comply with state law would have been trivial, at
most.2 3'
The federal court had alleviated any concerns about state auton-
omy by following a Pullman-type approach of staying its hand
while the state judiciary resolved the state law issues. Pullman ab-
stention had worked as intended. The state judiciary had deline-
ated formerly uncertain state-created rights, and thus had pre-
served its role as expositor of its own law. Under Pennhurst II,
however, the federal court as a practical matter could not provide a
forum to enforce the state-based rights that the plaintiffs had es-
tablished in Rogers after ten years of litigation.
In fact, Pennhurst itself demonstrates the overkill of the Court's
approach. In Pennhurst, the Third Circuit had predicated relief on
the plaintiff's state law claim only after the highest state court def-
initely had resolved the legal underpinning of the claim. Under
Pullman, the federal court had no reason to hesitate in applying
the newly defined state law. Federal courts do not necessarily in-
trude on state prerogatives simply by enforcing the clear mandates
of state laws. Indeed, the contrary conclusion rings true. Given the
context of the Pennhurst litigation, which Justice Powell all but
ignored in his opinion, the Court's federalism concerns were mis-
placed. The dragons threatening state autonomy that Justice Pow-
ell perceived in reality were windmills.
This is not to say that Pennhurst presented no federalism con-
cerns. The federal court's decree ordering state officials to deinsti-
tutionalize the residents at Pennhurst Hospital obviously intruded
on the operations of a state instrumentality. The affirmative obli-
gations that the decree imposed on the hospital officials would
have proven costly to the state treasury if the Supreme Court had
231. See supra notes 187-206 and accompanying text.
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upheld them. Perhaps an even greater intrusion would have re-
sulted from the close supervision given to decisions on appropriate
placement and habilitation of former Pennhurst residents by the
district court and by the court's special master under the federal
court's decree.23 2
The court order in Pennhurst was a classic institutional decree
that required the State to reorganize the way it cared for its men-
tally retarded patients. As such, the decree raised a series of diffi-
cult questions concerning how federal courts should function when
they are called on to remedy legal violations by state officials. 233 In
both Pennhurst I and Pennhurst II, the Court responded to these
questions by clearly articulating its unease with, and even hostility
to, the relief that the federal court had afforded.234 Unfortunately,
however, the Court in Pennhurst II evaded the difficult remedial
issues inherent in institutional decrees. Instead, it erected a juris-
dictional bar with an effect that ripples far beyond the mandate to
deinstitutionalize the residents of Pennhurst Hospital.23 5
The Court's evasion of such issues did not begin with Pennhurst
II. In recent years, a number of commentators have detected a ten-
dency by the Court to manifest its displeasure with institutional
and public law litigation by refusing access to federal courts on a
number of grounds.23 6 Moreover, just as Pennhurst II does not re-
present a beginning, it also does not represent a culmination. Its
continuing effect on the system of judicial federalism in controver-
sies involving overlapping state and federal claims will be subtle,
yet steady. As a result, Pullman abstention may be transmuted
from a doctrine that focuses on determining which state questions
a federal court should decide into a doctrine that focuses only on
determining which federal questions should be delayed or dis-
missed. Whether by design or by accident, the Court in Pennhurst
II has rendered federal tribunals less fit to resolve cases that
232. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
233. These difficulties are treated in depth in Mishkin, supra note 11.
234. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text; Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 106, 108.
235. See Brown, supra note 5, at 365-66.
236. See, e.g., id. at 363; Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation:
Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1 (1984); Neubourne, Procedural
Assault on the Warren Legacy: A Study in Repeal by Indirection, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 545
(1977).
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include both state and federal questions. The Court thus has im-
balanced the system of judicial federalism by promoting state judi-
ciaries as the only fully functioning courts able to resolve these
types of suits against state officials. Although Pennhurst II is
neither a beginning nor a culmination, it marks a point of accelera-
tion in the drive toward "deferential federalism 2 37 that character-
izes the High Court's recent approach to public law litigation
against state instrumentalities and officials.
Given the turbulent history of judicial federalism, however, ad-
vocates of a more moderate approach should not concede the even-
tual effectuation of the state-oriented trend embodied in Penn-
hurst IL In the past, the Court's concerted pushes toward one pole
or the other have created tempering responses. Chisholm produced
the eleventh amendment. Young and Siler followed Hans. Pull-
man, in turn, moderated the nationalist pull of Young and Siler 35
Some signals indicate that Pennhurst II may have contributed
to a similar reaction among members of the Court. For all the in-
flexibility of Pennhurst II, and the expansive rhetoric of the ma-
jority opinion, only four justices joined Justice Powell. Moreover,
the four dissenters have not remained silent since Pennhurst II. In
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,23 9 an otherwise unremark-
able eleventh amendment case decided at the close of the 1984
Term, these four justices joined in a dissenting opinion that urged
a fundamental rethinking of eleventh amendment immunity.2 40
The lengthy dissent, authored by Justice Brennan, took direct aim
at the conception of state sovereign immunity currently prevailing
on the Court: "The flawed underpinning [of the doctrine] is the
premise that either the Constitution or the Eleventh Amendment
embodied a principle of state sovereign immunity as a limit on the
federal judicial power."'241 The four dissenters in Atascadero
237. "Deferential federalism" is a term coined by Professor Brown. See Brown, supra
note 5, at 363.
238. See supra notes 24-94 and accompanying text.
239. 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985).
240. See id. at 3150 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
joined Justice Brennan in dissent. In Atascadero, the majority principally held that Con-
gress' enactment of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982), had not
abrogated the eleventh amendment immunity of states and state agencies. Id.
241. Id. at 3156. Justice Brennan, relying heavily on recent eleventh amendment scholar-
ship, argued that "the Framers never intended to constitutionalize the doctrine of state
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pushed as vigorously away from the state autonomy pole as Justice
Powell and his four adherents had marched toward it in Pennhurst
II, stating: "There simply is no constitutional principle of state
sovereign immunity, and no constitutionally mandated policy of
excluding suits against States from federal court. '242 To ensure
that no reader would miss the dissenters' direction, Justice Black-
mun added a brief, separate dissent 43 in which he linked the
Court's current eleventh amendment doctrine with the tenth
amendment immunity doctrine of National League of Cities v.
244thUsery, which the Court overruled recently in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.245
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Brennan wrote his dissenting opinion in Atascadero to
lay the theoretical groundwork for a fundamental shift in eleventh
amendment immunity. In effect, Justice Brennan sought to rein-
troduce the doctrine as it had existed before Hans. Whether he
will be able to convince another of his colleagues to join him and to
form a new majority on the Court is uncertain. 246 The more likely
prospect, at least for the immediate future, is that the justices will
remain almost evenly divided at the poles of the judicial federalism
continuum, and that they will continue to argue past one another.
This rift may prove the most unfortunate consequence of the pres-
sure caused by Pennhurst II. Development of a workable system
sovereign immunity as a limit on the federal judicial power." Id. at 3156 & n.U; see supra
note 46 (noting recent commentary concerning the eleventh amendment).
242. Id. at 3156. Justice Brennan argued that the eleventh amendment principles now
prevailing on the Court lack "a textual anchor, a firm historical foundation, or a clear ra-
tionale." Id. at 3155. In addition, he assailed the majority for putting "the federal judiciary
in the unseemly position of exempting the States from compliance with laws that bind every
other legal actor in our nation." Id. at 3150.
243. Id. at 3178 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
244. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
245. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). For a thoughtful attempt to reconcile the state sovereignty
themes of Atascadero and Garcia, which the Court decided during the same term, see
Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment Sur-
vived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 74 GEo. L.J. 363 (1985).
246. The majority in Atascadero did not respond in kind to Justice Brennan's substantial
treatment, contenting themselves with adhering to their federalism-based position in a foot-
note. See 105 S. Ct. at 3146 n.2.
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for allocating public law litigation against state officials never has
been easy. The task will be impossible, however, if the lack of com-
mon ground increasingly apparent in the justices' opposing visions
of judicial federalism continues to prevail. The Court in Pennhurst
H has set off centrifugal forces that push toward the nationalist
and states' rights poles of the judicial federalism continuum. The
accommodation of these interests, which is essential for a balanced,
workable system, must await a future consensus on the Court con-
cerning the appropriate role of federal courts in reviewing the ac-
tions of state officials.
